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U NCONSTITUTIONAL conditions are a conundrum. On the
one hand, if government can spend, why can't it place what-
ever conditions it wants on its spending? On the other hand, if it
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can place any conditions on spending, won't it be able to impose
restrictions that evade much of the Constitution, including most
constitutional rights? This enigma is notoriously complex, and un-
constitutional conditions therefore are considered a sort of Gor-
dian knot.
The standard solution is to slice through the knot with consent-
to conclude that consent excuses otherwise unconstitutional re-
strictions. This solution, however, is problematic, for it concedes
that the government can use consent to escape constitutional lim-
its. Accordingly, even in the consent analysis, it usually is recog-
nized that consent cannot be effective in all instances, lest it itself
become a threat. Consent, in other words, creates many loose ends
without really cutting through the problem. Indeed, the consent
analysis of unconstitutional conditions is widely acknowledged to
be inconsistent.
It therefore is necessary to reconsider consent. Rather than a so-
lution, consent is the source of the confusion.
This Article unravels the different roles of consent to under-
stand what it can do and what it cannot. In fact, the problem is
composed of at least three lines of inquiry: consent in general,
delegation, and force. In each strand of the problem, confusion can
be avoided simply by differentiating what consent can accomplish
and what it cannot.
On this basis, this Article concludes that consent is irrelevant for
conditions that go beyond the government's power. Under the
Constitution's grant of powers, consent often enables the govern-
ment to impose restrictions it could not impose directly. But this
does not mean that consent can justify the government in going
beyond its legal limits. The Constitution's limits on the government
are legal limits imposed with the consent of the people. Therefore,
neither private nor state consent can alter these limits or otherwise
enlarge the federal government's constitutional power. In this
sense, consent is irrelevant.
The implications are particularly concrete for the Constitution's
rights and structural limits. Unlike the enumerated powers, the
rights and structural limits generally do not define governmental
authority in terms of consent, but instead simply cut back on the
powers. For such purposes, the question is not whether the Consti-
tution empowers the government to impose restrictions consensu-
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ally that it could not impose directly. Instead, the question is
whether private or state consent can relieve the federal govern-
ment of its constitutional limitations. It thus becomes apparent, at
least as to rights and structural limits, that consent is irrelevant.
The Focus of the Debate. -Notwithstanding the confusion about
unconstitutional conditions, there is agreement about some basic
matters. In particular, there is hardly any dispute about two under-
lying points.
First, it is widely acknowledged that the powers granted by the
Constitution to the government give it broad authority to spend
and to place conditions on its expenditures.1 Second, on the other
side of the equation, it also is widely accepted that all of the powers
of the federal government, including the powers of Congress, are
limited by constitutional rights and by constitutional structures,
such as the separation of powers and the principles of federalism.
Thus, notwithstanding the breadth of the government's authority
to spend, it remains subject to limits. The disagreement comes
mainly at the next step, when it must be decided whether govern-
ment restrictions that otherwise violate constitutional rights or
structures can be cured by the consent of the restricted persons.2
'For such assumptions, see the literature cited infra note 2.
'The literature conventionally distinguishes between what are variously called
threats and purchases, or regulatory and contractual conditions-the assumption be-
ing that consent is a cure for an unconstitutional restriction, but not when the consent
is obtained by a threat or regulatory condition. Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal
Spending After Lopez, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1911, 1916 (1995) (distinguishing reim-
bursement versus regulatory spending); Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward
a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1185, 1217
(1990) (distinguishing regulatory and contractual conditions); Richard A. Epstein,
The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State
Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 14 (1988) [hereinafter Epstein,
Unconstitutional] (rejecting government bargains that are "induced by force and
fraud" or that "contemplate the use or threat of coercion or fraud against third par-
ties"); Philip Hamburger, Getting Permission, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 405, 444-45 (2007)
[hereinafter Hamburger, Getting Permission] (distinguishing regulatory and contrac-
tual conditions); Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review
Boards, 2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 271, 319-22 [hereinafter Hamburger, New Censorship]
(distinguishing regulatory and contractual conditions); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational
Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1293, 1301 (1984) (distinguishing threats and offers); Renee Lettow Lerner, Unconsti-
tutional Conditions, Germaneness, and Institutional Review Boards, 101 Nw. U. L.
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It will be seen that the inquiry about the effect of consent breaks
down into three problems. In each, it is necessary to separate out
consent's role within the government's constitutional power and its
role beyond such power.
Rev. 775, 788-89 (2007) (showing the need for a tighter fit between purpose and con-
ditions when distinguishing regulatory conditions and purchases).
Rejecting these conventional distinctions, some scholarship would have the Consti-
tution protect only selected substantive rights values from government purchases.
See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary
Theory, 61 B.U. L. Rev. 885 (1981) (explaining the availability of administrative due
process for denial of government benefits in terms of dignitary interests); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413, 1506 (1989) (argu-
ing that "all conditions on benefits that pressure certain preferred liberties" should be
subject "to the same strict scrutiny that such rights receive when burdened directly,"
thus securing both equality and "private ordering"); W. Stephen Westermann, Com-
pleting the Cathedral Taxonomy of Salient Legal Entitlement Forms: With Applica-
tion of the New Entitlement Forms to Describe Constitutional Rights, Rationalize the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine and Better Understand Legal Personhood 14-
15 (Nov. 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1505049) (arguing that government cannot discriminate against persons for
refusing to waive their fundamental rights or "strong property entitlements").
Some scholarship, moreover, takes a functionalist approach, based in Law and
Economics, to sort out when the government can purchase rights and when it cannot.
See Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining with the State 174 (1993) [hereinafter Epstein,
Bargaining] (arguing that the doctrine addresses the problem of government monop-
oly); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges,
and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 309, 349 (arguing that "the
doctrine serves to control cases of externalities and monopoly"); Thomas W. Merrill,
Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 Denv. U. L. Rev.
859, 869-72 (1995) [hereinafter Merill, Dolan] (arguing that private consent to waive
a constitutional right should be considered effective where it is apt to protect the pub-
lic interest, but not otherwise); Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitution and the Cathe-
dral: Prohibiting, Purchasing, and Possibly Condemning Tobacco Advertising, 93 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1143, 1144-45 (1999) [hereinafter Merrill, The Constitution and the Ca-
thedral] (using the distinction between property and liability rules to discern the en-
forceability of government bargains); Westermann, supra, at 15-16 (arguing that the
doctrine should apply not only where government exercises its police power monop-
oly but also where it has situational monopoly power).
In all of these approaches (as noted by Merrill) consent is not always determinative,
but nonetheless sometimes is. The difference among the approaches thus focuses on
when consent relieves the government of its constitutional limits. The literature sug-
gests that consent excuses otherwise unconstitutional restrictions (a) where they are
regulatory or otherwise come with coercion, (b) where they stay clear of selected sub-
stantive concerns, or (c) where private consent is aligned with the public interest, as
determined by Law and Economics. Although, as evident above, I previously have
assumed the merits of (a), I now am arguing for another approach, (d), which asserts
that private and state consent cannot relieve the federal government of the limits on
its authority and that, in this sense, consent is irrelevant.
Unconstitutional Conditions
First Inquiry: Consent. -The primary problem that needs to be
teased out of the supposed Gordian Knot is the general question of
the effect of consent. Can consent justify the government in ex-
ceeding its constitutional power?
The key is to distinguish between the role of consent within and
beyond the government's constitutional authority. As already sug-
gested, the government's total power or authority consists of the
powers minus the rights and structural limits. The powers granted
by the Constitution leave the government much authority to im-
pose conditions on benefits where it gets the consent of the recipi-
ents. In this sense, consent is part of the Constitution's measure of
the government's powers. These powers, however, are limited.
Even more concretely, they are subject to the Constitution's rights
and structures-limits that the Constitution generally does not de-
fine in terms of consent. It therefore is necessary to avoid any con-
fusion between the two uses of consent. Undoubtedly the govern-
ment can use consent within its authority, as defined by its various
powers; but where these powers are limited, either in themselves or
through the rights and structures, the question is whether the gov-
ernment can rely on consent to justify going beyond these limits
and thus beyond its authority.
The conventional analysis suggests that consent can relieve the
government of its constitutional limits. Rather than assume that
consent is merely a measure of the government's constitutional au-
thority under its powers, the standard analysis assumes that con-
sent also can justify the government in going beyond its author-
ity-perhaps by exceeding its powers and more clearly by breaking
through the constitutional limits on such powers.
The question of whether private or state consent can justify this
almost answers itself. The answer can be found in the simple rec-
ognition that the Constitution is a law. Being a law and, indeed, a
law made by the people, its limits are not alterable by private or
state consent, but only by the consent of the people. Even theories
of unwritten, informal constitutional change tend to assume the
consent of the people to an evolving law. Accordingly, the gov-
ernment cannot escape its constitutional bounds by getting, let
alone purchasing, the consent of any lesser body, whether indi-
viduals, private institutions, or states. For such purposes, their con-
sent is irrelevant.
2012] 483
Virginia Law Review
Such a conclusion is particularly unexpected on the question of
rights. The disputes about unconstitutional conditions tend to focus
on rights, and the scholarship assumes that because rights belong
to private persons, rights can be relinquished and thus can be
bought and sold.
The vision of tradable rights, however, fails to recognize that
constitutional rights are also structurally the people's legal limits
on the government's powers. Thus, although constitutional rights
are personal in the sense that they belong to persons, they protect
persons by limiting government. Indeed, it is characteristic of the
rights secured by the U.S. Constitution that, whatever their per-
sonal foundation and character, they are framed as limits on gov-
ernment.
This leads to a second point missed by the tradable-rights per-
spective-the distinction between merely leaving a constitutional
right unexercised and empowering government. Either intention-
ally by waiver or merely by forfeiture, individuals can leave a con-
stitutional right unexercised.3 But they cannot thereby give power
to government, for a constitutional right is a legal limit on govern-
ment imposed by the people. Thus, even when individuals relin-
quish the exercise of their freedom, they do not thereby grant gov-
ernment a power denied it by the Constitution. Private or state
consent cannot enlarge the government's constitutional power.'
Constitutional rights therefore are different from private rights.
The latter-such as property or contract rights-are merely per-
sonal and therefore can be waived or forfeited, whether by indi-
viduals, institutions, or states. In contrast, constitutional rights are
communally imposed legal limits, and the federal government
therefore cannot free itself from these limits by making side deals
with private or state actors. The consent of such persons matters
for their use of their rights, but it cannot give the federal govern-
ment any power that the Constitution denies it.
3For the sake of convenience, this Article merely distinguishes waiver and forfei-
ture, thus subsuming sales and assignments within waivers, and estoppels within for-
feitures.
In light of its argument, this Article avoids the conventional and misleading locu-
tion that an individual gives up a constitutional right. This evidently is shorthand for
saying that she gives up her exercise of the right, for if a right is a legally imposed limit
on government, she cannot give up the right itself, but only her exercise of it.
484 [Vol. 98:479
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Second Inquiry: Delegation. -A second problem of consent is
whether consensual delegation can cure unconstitutional condi-
tions. This delegation has received little attention in the scholarly
literature, but it matters, for the federal government increasingly
relies on consent to get others to do what it cannot. In particular, it
sometimes uses conditions on its benefits to persuade states and
private institutions to impose restrictions that violate federal rights
and structures.'
The delegation, however, cannot cure the federal government's
violation of its constitutional duties.6 To the extent the delegation
problem is noticed, it is viewed as a matter of consent, and un-
doubtedly there is a valuable and lawful role for consent as a
mechanism for delegation. But the use of consent to accomplish a
lawful delegation should not be confused with the use of consent to
justify an unlawful delegation, and the latter is particularly clear
when the government delegates restrictions that violate rights and
structural limits. For example, when the federal government per-
suades states or private institutions to suppress speech on its be-
half, it cannot be taken for granted that the federal government
can rely on their consent to justify its delegation. On the contrary,
in such circumstances, the federal government violates its constitu-
tional limits as much as if it had done so entirely by itself.
Evidently, neither consent nor delegation can excuse the gov-
ernment in acting outside its authority; most concretely, neither
can justify the government in imposing restrictions that violate the
limits on federal powers, whether the limits arise from rights or
structures. But this is not the end of the matter, for sometimes-
most clearly when a condition violates a constitutional right-there
remains the question of whether the condition is imposed by force.
Third Inquiry: Force. -Like the other problems here, that of
government force is bound up with misplaced assumptions about
' Delegation has received attention in the literature on privatization. See, e.g.,
Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1367, 1367 (2003)
(observing that "current state action doctrine is fundamentally inadequate to address
the constitutional challenge presented by privatization").
6 A government's constitutional duties are understood here as its legal duties under
a constitution, not more broadly as its moral or political duties in a constitutional sys-
tem.
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consent. Government force is a necessary element of some consti-
tutional violations, and because consent seems to be the opposite
of force, it often is assumed that conditions lack government force
The existence of consent, however, does not preclude the exis-
tence of force. Already at the time of consent, there is always a
question of whether the consent was induced by force. Afterward,
moreover, the government often relies on force-indeed, the force
of law-to implement its conditions.
Thus, the central and lawful role of consent in conditions should
not lead one to conclude that there is no force in inducing or im-
plementing them.8 Of course, it can be difficult to figure out
whether a condition comes with constitutionally significant gov-
ernment force. It will be seen, however, that such force is discerni-
ble in some instances-in particular, when the government seeks
regulatory conditions, and when it seeks conditions that run into
the future.
A Diminished Problem. -Ultimately, the three inquiries here
suggest that for some central constitutional protections, there is no
need for an independent doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Such a doctrine may be necessary for determining whether Con-
gress has the authority within its enumerated powers to offer a
condition, but not for resolving whether the restriction in the con-
dition violates the constitutional limits-rights or structures-that
confine the enumerated powers. In such instances, if consent and
delegation cannot cure the unconstitutionality of the restriction,
then much of the distinctiveness of unconstitutional conditions dis-
appears. For such purposes, indeed, it becomes apparent that there
'Force is not always an element of a violation of a right, for the government can es-
tablish a church merely by funding it. Indeed, an establishment of religion tradition-
ally was understood to be a matter of government privileges rather than government
constraints.
8Of course, conditions often are candidly framed as elements of consensual ar-
rangements, and it therefore could be enough to recognize that they are contrary to
public policy. Even in contracts merely between private parties, conditions contrary
to either law or public policy are void, notwithstanding the lack of state action. Ac-
cordingly, the point here about the presence of government force may be considered
unnecessary. See infra notes 70, 77. The conundrum of unconstitutional conditions,
however, is said to rest on the absence of any government force, and this Article
therefore shows that force frequently is present.
[Vol. 98:479486
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is no need to speak about unconstitutional "conditions," it being
sufficient to speak simply of unconstitutional "restrictions."
In other words, as with directly imposed restrictions, so with
those imposed by consent, the question is merely whether the gov-
ernment has gone beyond its constitutional authority. This may re-
quire a complicated doctrine of unconstitutional conditions where
the inquiry concerns the enumerated powers. But the question is
relatively simple and familiar where it concerns the rights or struc-
tures that cut back on such powers.
Foundations in the Case Law. -The argument here has uneven
but substantial foundations in the case law. The cases on unconsti-
tutional conditions are so poorly conceptualized that they cannot
provide more than rough support for any theory of such condi-
tions, but even this limited foundation is valuable.
Most basically, the case law tends to recognize that rights and
structural limits confine even the broadest of constitutional pow-
ers. This may seem a simple point, but it is fundamental, and this
Article builds on it.
More elaborate judicial foundations for the argument here can
be observed in Professor Thomas Merrill's study of how courts re-
solve unconstitutional conditions cases. He argues that "some con-
stitutional rights are not just private entitlements but also have as-
pects of public goods," and that "when constitutional rights are
perceived by courts as having a large public goods dimension,"
courts hesitate to enforce the conditions in which individuals waive
such rights.9 Put succinctly, private consent explains the case law
only when the private consent seems aligned with the public inter-
est. Although this insight is inchoate in the cases, and is therefore
more attributable to Merrill than the judges, it suggests the depth
of support that can be discerned in the cases. In this instance, the
cases hint that private consent cannot relieve the government of
public limits.
Inevitably, however, this Article will in places depart from the
case law. It is notorious that the cases on unconstitutional condi-
tions are poorly conceptualized and consequently are hesitant, in-
9Merrill, Dolan, supra note 2, at 862. For further discussion of this point, and how
this Article departs from it, see infra notes 46-47, 81 and accompanying text.
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consistent, and confusing." The decisions of the courts therefore
have the character of old maps of the New World, which blindly
sketch out terra incognita with better intentions than accuracy. It
thus is to be expected that a more systematic conceptualizing of the
problem will reveal some past decisions to be outliers.
Indeed, the confusion in the existing case law suggests that the
existing decisions cannot be considered very deeply entrenched. Of
all areas of constitutional law, unconstitutional conditions is the
one most likely to benefit from a candid recognition that the Court
has been engaged in exploratory guesswork rather than accurate
mapping of the territory. Precisely because the Court has had to
reach decisions before it has fully appreciated the contours of the
problem, its cases should not be understood to preclude a more ac-
curate approach-one that benefits from the early, tentative efforts
at topography, but that more carefully follows the lay of the land.
Adjacent Problems. -In focusing on unconstitutional condi-
tions, this Article also touches upon some other, neighboring prob-
lems. Each of these other problems has the potential to be impor-
tant on its own account, but they are included here because they
locate the problem of unconstitutional conditions in its context. In-
deed, these adjacent problems reveal the problem of unconstitu-
tional conditions to be a key element in a dangerous cluster of de-
velopments.
For example, although the main point here is that consent can-
not cure unconstitutional conditions, there is also the related point
that consent is no cure for conditions that, although not unconstitu-
tional, are otherwise unlawful. To be sure, statutes (let alone regu-
lations) are not imposed by the people. They are, however, im-
posed by Congress, and until they are repealed, their restrictions
on government are legal limits, which cannot be removed by the
consent of individuals, private institutions, or states. Thus, al-
though this Article focuses on unconstitutional conditions, its
analysis more generally applies to all unlawful conditions.
'0 Many commentators, including Richard Epstein, Thomas Merrill, and Justice Ste-
vens, have observed that, as put by the latter, the doctrine has "long suffered from
notoriously inconsistent application." Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 407 n.12
(1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For the other commentators, see citations supra note
2. The doctrine itself, however, has also been problematic.
Unconstitutional Conditions
Another neighboring problem concerns state and private viola-
tions of law at the request of the federal government. The conven-
tional unconstitutional conditions problem concentrates on the
federal government's violation of its own legal duties. When, how-
ever, the government asks state and private institutions to do what
it cannot, there is the additional problem that the states and institu-
tions will end up directly violating their legal duties. This is a much
simpler problem, for a federal request or contract is no excuse for a
direct violation of law. For example, if the federal government
funds states on the condition that they license speech, then quite
apart from the complexities of unconstitutional conditions, the
complying states will have squarely violated their own constitu-
tions, the Fourteenth Amendment, and a range of federal and state
statutes.
Yet another adjacent problem concerns freedom of speech.
Conditions allow the federal government to evade the Bill of
Rights, and not surprisingly, the government therefore uses condi-
tions to control talking and publishing in ways it could not do di-
rectly. The law on the First Amendment, however, has largely ig-
nored this danger, and this leads to the question of whether such
law has remained mired in the past. For example, the study of the
First Amendment still largely focuses on prosecutions, injunctions,
and libel actions, all of which are relatively small-scale retail pro-
ceedings against individuals. This focus was at least plausible up
through the 1960s, when government was more limited and its re-
tail threats seemed so salient. The current realities, however, in-
clude a massive administrative state, its imposition of wholesale
controls on talking and publishing, and its use of conditions to im-
pose these controls at all levels of society, including private conver-
sations with family members, with doctors, and even with God."
Fortunately, as argued here, there are constitutional barriers to un-
constitutional conditions. But the reality that conditions present a
new and expanding threat to freedom of speech needs to be recog-
nized in the study of the First Amendment.
1See, respectively, the regulations enforced by Institutional Review Boards
("IRBs"), discussed in text accompanying infra note 31, which apply even to students
who interview their family members; Rust v. Sullivan discussed in text accompanying
infra note 101; and § 501(c)(3) discussed in infra note 26 and accompanying text.
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The most serious adjacent danger is government by contract.
Government once ordinarily exercised power by adopting laws that
restrained freedom. In these circumstances, constitutional law con-
sisted mostly of limits on such restraints-the primary exception
being the Establishment Clause. Nowadays, however, the federal
government governs not merely by force of law, but increasingly by
contract.'2 This has many dangers, including not only an evasion of
constitutional limits but also an erosion of the distinction between
public and private life. The dangers are especially harsh for the
poor and otherwise financially vulnerable. More than the wealthy,
they are apt to feel they have no choice but to sell their rights for
government benefits. As a result, government by contract tends to
create an unofficial caste system, which offers the formalities of
equal freedom, but which actually deprives the financially weak of
their liberty, thus reinforcing financial vulnerabilities with legal in-
equalities.
Overview. -The primary question here is about consent: Does
the consent of restricted persons relieve the government of its con-
stitutional limits? A secondary concern is delegation: Does consen-
sual delegation to an agent allow the government to accomplish
what it could not do by itself? Finally, there is the question of
force: Even though conditions are obtained by consent, do many of
them nonetheless come with government force?
The argument proceeds as follows: First, unconstitutional condi-
tions pose a more serious problem than usually is recognized, for
they allow the government to evade the Bill of Rights and other
constitutional limits. Second, consent has been a source of much
confusion about unconstitutional conditions, and therefore, to un-
derstand such conditions, the different roles of consent in different
problems need to be distinguished. Third, and most centrally, con-
sent is no cure. Fourth, consensual delegation is no cure. Fifth, al-
though conditions have consent, many conditions, most clearly
those that are regulatory or that bind into the future, are backed
with constitutionally significant government force. Sixth, these
points about consent, delegation, and force explain a wide range of
12 See Metzger, supra note 5, at 1367.
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conditions without unraveling the conditions needed by govern-
ment.
I. EVASION
Before turning to the conceptual problem, this Article must con-
sider the threat from unconstitutional conditions. Although they
have long been treated as merely a peripheral danger, they have
become of central importance, for they have become a means of
evading much of the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.
Only by recognizing this can one begin to understand the peril of
casually assuming that the government can purchase its way out of
constitutional rights and other limits.
A. Evasion
The evasion of constitutional limits arises from the distinction
between government restraints on liberty and the benefits received
from government. Although this distinction has been disputed, it
remains profoundly important for understanding conditions on
government benefits."
Much of the Constitution protects liberty by limiting the federal
government in its imposition of constraints. For example, the First
Amendment forbids the government from prohibiting the free ex-
ercise of religion. 4 Only rarely does the Constitution so concretely
limit the government in its distribution of benefits-the best exam-
ple being when the First Amendment prohibits Congress from
making any law respecting an establishment of religion, thus most
centrally barring some types of government subsidies and other
privileges."
Because the Constitution typically protects liberty by limiting
government constraints, not government benefits, the government
13 Scholarly questions about the distinction arise, in part, from aspirations for equal-
ity in benefits. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439 (1968). The distinction,
however, is ingrained in the Constitution and in the nature of American society, let
alone deeper considerations. The point here is merely that the distinction underlies
most discussions of unconstitutional conditions.
' U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... .
15 Id.
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seems largely unlimited when it places conditions on its benefits.
Accordingly, if the federal government merely attaches conditions
to its spending or other benefits, it apparently can escape most
constitutional protections for liberty. The Supreme Court occa-
sionally has attempted to stave off the danger from such condi-
tions, but not with much clarity or breadth, for if the government's
conditions merely are aspects of its benefits, they do not ordinarily
seem limited by the Constitution. 6
As a result, conditions on benefits offer a path of evasion. By
casting restrictions on liberty in terms of conditions rather than di-
rect constraints, the government can escape not only its limited
powers but also most of the limits on such powers, including most
of the Bill of Rights.
The danger is especially serious because the government spends
ever larger amounts, thus allowing it increasingly to use its finan-
cial muscle to accomplish what the Constitution forbids. In almost
every sector of the economy, what once were private companies
and institutions, working with private capital, are now recipients of
government largess. And with this federal money comes a growing
range of opportunities for the government to exercise power with-
out complying with the limitations imposed by the Constitution.
B. Illustrations
The most sobering examples of the evasion are speech condi-
tions. All governments are tempted to restrict speech, and when
conditions on benefits are understood to escape constitutional lim-
its, this practically invites the government to sidestep the First
Amendment.
Although the speech examples recited below generically illus-
trate the risk of evasion, they also more specifically show the dan-
ger for individuals, vulnerable groups, and the people as a whole.
Individuals lose their freedom of speech; minorities or other finan-
16The leading case is South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (holding that
even if Congress lacks the power directly to impose a national minimum drinking age,
its spending power allows it to allocate highway funds on the condition that states im-
pose a minimum drinking age of twenty-one years). This stands in contrast to United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74 (1936) (holding that Congress cannot rely on its spend-
ing power to give tax relief to farmers who comply with conditions restricting their
production).
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cially vulnerable groups relinquish their voice in the society; and
the people are deprived of essential constraints on government.
Suppression of Political Speech of § 501 (c) (3) Organizations. -An
initial example concerns the political speech of § 501(c)(3) organi-
zations, whether charitable, educational, or religious. Under the
tax code, these organizations are exempt from federal income
taxes, and their donors receive tax deductions, but all of this is on
the condition that the organizations refrain from two particularly
salient forms of political speech: They may not campaign for or
against any political candidate, and they may not do more than a
minimal amount of lobbying to influence legislation.17
It is difficult to think of more central types of speech or petition-
ing or a more blatant suppression of them. If Congress had acted
directly, it clearly would have acted unconstitutionally. But be-
cause Congress acted through conditions on what are understood
as tax benefits, it seems to be able to evade the First Amendment. 8
" They may not "participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distrib-
uting of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
candidate for public office." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). And such an organization may
engage in lobbying only as long as such activities do not constitute a "substantial
part" of its activities. Id.
18 It is by no means clear that the exemption and deductibility granted by § 501(c)(3)
are really government benefits--either in the sense of the distribution of government
property or even in the more general sense of government privileges. To start with,
§ 501(c)(3) merely offers relief from a general tax. It therefore clearly is not a benefit
in the sense of a grant of government property. Instead, if it is a government benefit
or privilege, it amounts to this because it grants an exemption from a more general
constraint. Obviously, however, what is framed as an exemption or privilege can
sometimes really be an unequal constraint.
Conventionally, the exemption is said to be a government benefit for § 501(c)(3)
organizations, but this description is incomplete, for the tax relief is conditional on a
type of political silence. It therefore is more accurate to say the exemption is a privi-
lege or benefit for § 501(c)(3) organizations that are willing to submit to censorship.
Even this, however, is not sufficiently accurate, for although the tax code frames
§ 501(c)(3) in terms of exemptions, it actually subjects § 501(c)(3) organizations to
government restraints or penalties. Considered on its own, § 501(c)(3) is an exemp-
tion and thus a privilege or benefit from government. When one examines it, how-
ever, in the context of the tax code, § 501(c)(3) is a mechanism that subjects different
§ 501(c)(3) organizations to different tax burdens: a very low burden for those that
submit to censorship of their petitioning and political speech and a higher burden for
those that do not submit. The government tells charitable, educational, and religious
organizations that they must pay high taxes and have no donor deductibility if they
petition and speak freely, but that they can avoid taxes and get donor deductibility if
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Of course, Congress may have good reason to exempt or subsi-
dize institutions without paying for campaigning or lobbying. A
circle of money, moving back and forth between Congress and tax-
exempt organizations, would be very worrisome. But when Con-
gress subsidizes business corporations, it frequently leaves ample
room for expansive circles of money-as evident in industries as
diverse as healthcare, banking, and defense. It therefore remains
an open question as to why Congress is so worried about a circle of
money involving charitable, educational, and religious organiza-
tions. Is the circle of money more dangerous as to educational in-
stitutions than as to defense contractors?
At the very least, Congress can avoid a circle of money from
§ 501(c)(3) organizations in much less restrictive ways than by de-
nying them basic political speech. For example, Congress could
subsidize particular church or charitable projects, dedicated to par-
ticular ends or messages. It even could do this through dedicated
subsidiary organizations.19 Congress, however, instead takes the
they do not lobby too much and do not campaign. Thus, although it is sufficient here
to accept Congress's assumption that it is giving tax benefits to § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions, the reality is that the tax code imposes constraints or penalties on the speech
and petitioning of such groups.
This conclusion, moreover, has rather strong foundations in precedent. Although
the Supreme Court has upheld the lobbying restrictions, it did not do so on the
ground that the tax code merely offered a benefit or privilege. On the contrary, the
Court recognized that the tax code imposes what ordinarily would be an unconstitu-
tional restriction on speech, but the Court excused the restriction on the ground that
the restricted organizations enjoy freedom of speech through associated entities.
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983) (upholding
denial of federal tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) for nonprofit organizations that en-
gage in substantial lobbying, because the organizations could use a parallel organiza-
tion for lobbying). This sort of justification has been called into question in Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 882 (2010) (holding that the ability of corporations to
engage in electioneering speech through political action committees does not excuse a
ban on corporate electioneering expenditures). Nonetheless, the decision in Regan
remains an acknowledgment (unaffected by Citizens United) that the tax code im-
poses a restriction on the political speech of § 501(c)(3) organizations. All that
changed in Citizens United was the recognition that the unconstitutionality of this sort
of restriction cannot be justified by the availability of speech through a parallel or-
ganization.
19 In other words, rather than suppress the political speech of an entire church or
other § 501(c)(3) organization, Congress could simply grant money to satellite organi-
zations. Instead, however, Congress forces churches and other § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions to engage in lobbying through satellites, namely § 501(c)(4) organizations, and
broadly bars the political speech of the central organization.
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most restrictive approach. It views tax exemptions as grants to
§ 501(c)(3) organizations and then uses this as a justification for
suppressing the political speech of the entire organizations and
their personnel."
Similarly, Congress might reasonably worry that donors could
use § 501(c)(3) organizations as avenues for what, in effect, would
be tax-deductible political contributions, but if this were Con-
gress's real concern, it again could adopt a much less restrictive ap-
proach. Rather than sweepingly bar § 501(c)(3) organizations from
engaging in electoral politics, it could simply deny deductibility for
donations made for electoral purposes. This would limit the tax
benefit to the donors without limiting the political speech of the
churches or the donors. Again, however, Congress has not adopted
narrow solutions for narrow problems, but instead has used the
narrow problems to justify broad suppression of entire organiza-
tions.
Congress's focus on charitable, educational, and religious or-
ganizations is especially troubling because these are the groups
that are apt to shape American life independently of politics.
These institutions offer a cultural alternative to the more politically
centered life that prevails in the federal government, and this is
one reason why, as Alexis de Tocqueville observed, they are so
important for maintaining liberty in America." It therefore, per-
haps, is no coincidence that Congress has sought to limit their par-
ticipation in politics. They are a source of energy and power that is
relatively independent from political control, and this can seem
irksome to politicians who do not want to be held accountable to
such forces. For such politicians, it seems only natural that these
organizations should be confined to cultural matters, understood as
distinct from politics. Yet this denies the breadth of both cultural
and political experience in America. Of particular significance
here, it cuts off politics from the cultural life that simultaneously
sustains and competes with political life.
2Although the word "personnel" ordinarily means only employees, it is loosely
used here, for lack of a better term, to mean an institution's employees, students,
members, and any other individuals associated with it.
21 This is often discussed in terms of "civil society," but because this modern use of
the phrase differs from traditional Lockean usage, it tends to be a source of confusion
and is therefore avoided here.
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At a more personal level, the censorship is worrisome because
§ 501(c)(3) organizations often are the means by which many of
their employees and members give expression to their highest so-
cial, religious, and political aspirations. Business organizations do
not have members, but only partners or shareholders, and they
generally are not organized for expressive purposes. Charitable,
educational, and religious organizations, however, have personnel
not only in the sense of employees but also in the sense of mem-
bers or students, who often are the very life of these organizations.
Accordingly, it is important to keep in mind that the censorship of
these organizations reaches far beyond the formal organizational
bodies and their leaders and employees; it also reaches their per-
sonnel in the broadest sense, including the members of charities
and churches who pressure Congress and campaign on behalf of
their organizations.
The evasion of the First Amendment is most astonishing as to
churches and their ministers. For centuries, the clergy have partici-
pated in American elections from the pulpit. From this vantage
point, they preached in favor of the Revolution, in favor of the
Constitution, and for and against Presidents, Senators, and Con-
gressmen. Without such preaching and associated petitioning, es-
pecially in connection with elections and legislation, the anti-
slavery movement and the civil rights movement would have been
utterly enfeebled. To understand this, one need only recall the re-
alities. The anti-slavery movement was sustained by thousands of
New England clergymen, who systematically preached and peti-
tioned against servitude.22 Similarly, the civil rights movement was
"For example, in the space of only six weeks in 1854, over 3,200 sermons were
preached against the Nebraska Bill in New England and New York. The bill allowed
the residents of what became Nebraska and Kansas to choose whether slavery would
be legal within their territories, and it thereby undermined the Missouri Compro-
mise's bar against slavery in these areas. More than 3,000 New England clergymen
petitioned Congress against the bill. Victor B. Howard, Conscience and Slavery: The
Evangelistic Calvinist Domestic Missions, 1837-1861, at 132-34 (1990). The memorial
declared:
The undersigned, clergymen of different religious denominations in New
England, hereby, in the name of Almighty God, and in his presence, do sol-
emnly protest against the passage of what is known as the Nebraska Bill, or any
repeal or modification of the existing legal prohibitions of slavery in that part of
our national domain which it is proposed to organize into the territories of Ne-
braska and Kansas. We protest against it as a great moral wrong, as a breach of
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led not by a politician, but by a clergyman, the Reverend Martin
Luther King Jr. who preached equal rights and marched to Wash-
ington to share this gospel with Congress.'
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has upheld the § 501(c)(3) re-
strictions on lobbying on the ground that a church or other
§ 501(c)(3) organization can set up a parallel § 501(c)(4) organiza-
tion to engage in the prohibited lobbying." But this misses the
point. The church itself has a right to speak, and speech through a
related organization is not the same. The Supreme Court recently
recognized the underlying principle in Citizens United v. FEC. An
act of Congress barred corporations from engaging in electioneer-
ing speech, while permitting them to engage in such speech
through Political Action Committees ("PACs"). The Court, how-
ever, held this unconstitutional, explaining that "[a] PAC is a sepa-
rate association from the corporation. So the PAC exemption from
[the] expenditure ban.., does not allow corporations to speak."25
Similarly, a church has a right to speak out and petition as a
church. This matters because, when the church itself speaks and
petitions, it makes a theological commitment. It thereby exerts a
persuasive force that cannot be matched by the speaking and peti-
tioning of a different body that is not the church. The suppression
faith eminently unjust to the moral principles of the community, and subversive
of all confidence in national engagements; as a measure full of danger to the
peace and even the existence of our beloved Union, and exposing us to the
righteous judgments of the Almighty: and your protestants, as in duty bound,
will ever pray.
Protest of 3,050 New England Clergymen (Mar. 1, 1854), in David Christy, Pulpit
Politics: or, Ecclesiastical Legislation on Slavery 598-99 (Faran & McLean, Cincinnati
1862). See generally Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 244-45
(2002).
The depth of the clerical and religious role is nicely captured by a list of some of
the speakers at the 1963 March on Washington: The Very Reverend Patrick O'Boyle,
Archbishop of Washington; Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, Stated Clerk of the United
Presbyterian Church of the U.S.A.; Rabbi Uri Miller, President of the Synagogue
Council of America; Mathew Ahmann, Executive Director of the National Catholic
Conference for Interracial Justice; Rabbi Joachim Prinz, President of the American
Jewish Congress; and of course the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. See March
on Washington For Jobs and Freedom: Lincoln Memorial Program (Aug. 28, 1963),
in Bayard Rustin Papers, John F. Kennedy Library, National Archives and Records
Administration, available at http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash
=true&doc=96.
24 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540,546 (1983).
2 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010).
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imposed by § 501(c)(3) is doubly serious because it reaches down
from the institutional to the individual level. Most obviously, it
prevents a clergyman from speaking or even praying aloud in his
church on the election of politicians, thus depriving a minister of
his speech and prayer in his own pulpit on questions that long have
been of profound theological concern to the American clergy.26
Equally, it prevents his congregants from speaking out on ques-
tions where they, rather than their minister, speak for their
church-for example, in jointly praying, singing, witnessing, or
subscribing to a creed. It therefore is irrelevant that the church can
set up a parallel § 501(c)(4) organization to speak or lobby, for this
does not preserve the speech or petitioning of the church itself and
it does nothing for the rights of the clergyman who has been si-
lenced in his pulpit, let alone his congregants who have been si-
lenced in their work on behalf of their church.27
It is particularly astonishing that the restrictions bar not only the lobbying or peti-
tioning of Congress but also, at least as to electioneering, the lobbying or petitioning
of God. The clergy may be misdirecting their energies when they petition God about
who will be among the elect in Congress, but this is no excuse for Congress to inter-
pose itself between God and those who lobby and petition him.
27 Perhaps not surprisingly, Congress's suppressive intent was particularly overt as to
religious and other § 501(c)(3) speech in election campaigns. Suppressive intent is not
ordinarily a measure of whether a law abridges the freedom of speech-the notable
exception being United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)-but it is clarifying to
observe such intent, for it suggests the harsh reality of what Congress did. Prior to
1954, a religious or other charitable organization was exempt from federal income tax
if "no substantial part" of its activities consisted of "carrying on propaganda, or oth-
erwise attempting, to influence legislation." I.R.C. § 101(6) (1952). It has been shown,
however, that Senator Lyndon Johnson came to believe that such organizations also
should be barred from elections. James D. Davidson, Why Churches Cannot Endorse
or Oppose Political Candidates, 40 Rev. of Religious Res. 16, 16 (1998); Patrick L.
O'Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A Historical Perspective of the Permeable
IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by Churches, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 733 (2001).
Johnson ran in the 1954 Texas democratic primary against a local Catholic, Dudley
Dougherty, who "was one of the first Catholics to run for state-wide office in the
State of Texas." O'Daniel, supra, at 769. Johnson's allies and probably Johnson him-
self therefore worried about religious opposition, and certainly his religious support-
ers circulated ugly warnings against Catholic opposition, primarily from "the Roman
Catholic Mexican vote," which "ha[d] been organized against him." Id. at 748. Even
more seriously, Johnson faced severe criticism from conservative anti-communist
groups, which enjoyed tax-free status as educational organizations. Id. at 753, 762;
Davidson, supra, at 22-26. During the campaign, therefore, in June 1954, Johnson ar-
ranged for Representative John McCormack-the Senate Democratic Whip-to ask
the Commissioner of the IRS to reconsider the tax status of one of the groups. David-
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It ordinarily would be recognized that such restrictions on
speech and petitioning are unconstitutional. They limit the political
speech of individuals and other persons, they target particular
groups, and in both ways they deprive the people as a whole of a
sort of speech that has long served as perhaps the most profound
structural limit on government. Yet because the restrictions come
in the form of conditions on benefits, and because the affected or-
ganizations consent, it is thought that there is no constitutional vio-
lation. This is but the first illustration of how, by means of condi-
tions, the government openly evades the Bill of Rights.
Licensing of Human-Subjects Research. -A second example can
be found in the regulations on human-subjects research. These
regulations are imposed by seventeen federal departments or
agencies-most prominently, the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services ("HHS"). The regulations require universities and
other institutions that receive any federal support for human-
subjects research to establish Institutional Review Boards
("IRBs").' These boards review and censor both the academic
speech employed within research on human subjects and the publi-
cation arising from such research.
son, supra, at 28; O'Daniel, supra, at 763-64. It turned out, however, that it had not
violated the bar on lobbying. O'Daniel, supra, at 764-65.
Johnson responded in July 1954 by ensuring that § 501(c)(3) organizations would
never again interfere in an election. The tax code was then being redrafted, and John-
son offered and obtained an amendment stating that such organizations could not
"participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of state-
ments), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for
public office." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). (For Johnson's contribution, see Davidson, supra, at
17-18; O'Daniel, supra, at 765-66.) Section 501(c)(3) organizations already could not
engage in lobbying, and they now could not participate in elections.
Slightly more than a century and a half earlier, Thomas Jefferson and his political
allies had introduced the idea of separation of church and state into American politi-
cal life in order to browbeat his clerical opponents into silence. Hamburger, supra
note 22, at 109-90. Now Johnson completed the realization of this sort of ugly objec-
tive by making political silence a condition of tax benefits for § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions.
8 According to regulations, "this policy applies to all research involving human sub-
jects conducted, supported or otherwise subject to regulation by any federal depart-
ment or agency which takes appropriate administrative action to make the policy ap-
plicable to such research." 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2010). This refers to human-subjects
research "supported" by the government so as to include even research that gets only
the most minimal support, such as the mere loan of a book.
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The professed purpose of the regulations is to prevent harm
from research on human subjects, but the harm is largely informa-
tional. Human subjects are defined as persons from whom, or
about whom, one gets information. 9 Moreover, "research" is de-
fined as a systematic attempt to develop "generalizable knowl-
edge"-in other words, academic inquiry to develop a publishable
hypothesis-and most IRBs bluntly recognize that they therefore
must review inquiry that is "publishable" or is done with an intent
to "publish."3 Indeed, most of what IRBs do is to adjust and oth-
erwise censor what academics and students can say to other per-
sons, whether in acquiring information during their research or
later in publishing their results." This may sound astonishing, but
2' The regulations state:
Human subject means a living individual about whom an investigator (whether
professional or student) conducting research obtains
(1) Data through intervention or interaction with the individual, or
(2) Identifiable private information.
... Interaction includes communication or interpersonal contact between in-
vestigator and subject. Private information includes information about behav-
ior that occurs in a context in which an individual can reasonably expect that
no observation or recording is taking place, and information which has been
provided for specific purposes by an individual and which the individual can
reasonably expect will not be made public (for example, a medical record).
45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2010).
Although the regulations refer to "private" information, this is understood very
broadly to include much that is clearly public and constitutionally protected. For ex-
ample, it is understood to include much information in printed and manuscript mate-
rials that is publically available in public libraries. Astonishingly, it also is understood
to include much information in public records, including census data and court re-
cords. See Hamburger, Getting Permission, supra note 2, at 423,432, 435.
These regulations apply regardless of whether the research is in the hard sciences,
the social sciences, or the arts, and regardless of whether the information is acquired
by injecting foreign substances into people or, most commonly, merely by talking,
writing, and reading. It thus covers inquiry that includes epidemiological surveys, po-
litical science surveys, polling, interviews of politicians, literary research in manu-
scripts, and legal inquiry that involves talking to lawyers or even (as suggested above)
reading the public records of recent cases. See Hamburger, New Censorship, supra
note 2, at 293,344.
30 See Hamburger, Getting Permission, supra note 2, at 431-32.
31 Of course, after-the-fact regulations of speech are not absolutely barred, and this
is especially true when the regulated speech is mixed with conduct in "expressive
conduct." Accordingly, it may be thought that the licensing of "research" is not
clearly unconstitutional. But licensing is different from other regulations of speech.
This prior review of words is a forbidden method of control, which cannot be excused
by the doctrines that are used to permit some after-the-fact regulation of speech.
(Note that licensing thus is distinguishable from injunctions, which need to be under-
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HHS views information from or about human beings as a health
risk, and on this account licenses the use of speech to acquire or
share such information.
This prior review or licensing of speech and publication is very
similar to the licensing that the Inquisition and the Star Chamber
imposed in the seventeenth century.32 The similarities even reach
down to the focus on universities and academics. The Star Cham-
ber, for example, required the leading officers of the English uni-
versities to license academic publications; by the same token HHS
requires assurances from such officers that they will establish IRBs
at their institutions to license academic inquiry and publication
concerning human subjects.33 The primary change has been in the
stood more like after-the-fact regulation. See id. at 413-14, 418, 427-30.) For exam-
ple, the content-discrimination doctrine serves to permit some after-the-fact regula-
tion of speech, if the regulation does not discriminate on the basis of content, but this
is irrelevant to licensing, which is dangerous and strictly forbidden, regardless of
whether the licensing law discriminates on the basis of content. Id. at 427-30. (As it
happens, the IRB laws discriminate on the basis of content, id. at 433-34, but this
need not be pursued here.)
Similarly, although the doctrine on expressive conduct serves to permit some after-
the-fact regulation of speech where it is mixed with conduct, it makes no difference
for licensing aimed at words, which is strictly prohibited regardless of whether the
words are mixed with conduct. Id. at 427-30. For example, in Freedman v. Maryland,
the Supreme Court left room for some licensing of motion pictures, but it did not ac-
knowledge that the government could have licensed the words. 380 U.S. 51, 58-59
(1965); see infra text accompanying note 40. That licensing directed at words is
barred, regardless of any mixture with conduct, is also evident from the history of li-
censing. The English licensing laws established licensing not only of words but also of
printers, printing presses, the production of printing type, and the importation of
books-all of which licensing involved conduct, but all of which clearly would today
be unconstitutional. Note also that the harms occurring in research and other admix-
tures of speech and conduct are of a sort that usually can easily be regulated after the
fact.
32 Hamburger, Getting Permission, supra note 2, at 429, 448-49 (noting similarities
between IRB licensing and Star Chamber licensing); id. at 481, 495 (noting parallels
with the licensing imposed by the Inquisition); id. at 426 n.60 (noting parallels with
inquisitorial process). The connection between the licensing by the Inquisition and
that by the Star Chamber is no coincidence, for the licensing in England under the
king's prerogative, and later under acts of Parliament, was drawn from the licensing
developed by the Church. See Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of
Seditious Libel and the Control of the Press, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 661, 671-72 (1985)
(tracing the development of the licensing of the press); see also Fredrick Seaton
Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England, 1476-1776, at 42 (1952).
" A Decree of Starre-Chamber, Concerning Printing, sig. B3, § III (London, Robert
Barker 1637).
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goal of the licensing. Whereas the highest end of the Inquisition
and Star Chamber in imposing licensing was to protect the dignity
of God, the ultimate goal of HHS and its IRBs is to protect the dig-
nity of human beings. 4
Of course, government has an interest in preventing harm, but
this does not mean it needs to use the licensing of speech or the
press for this end. Nor can it justify such licensing by categorizing
academic speech and publication as a health risk-as if the minor-
ity devoted to empirical research and publication are particularly
dangerous. 5 On the contrary, licensing of words has long been rec-
ognized as the most dangerous method of controlling what is said
or published-a method that is prohibited regardless of content or
speaker.36 It is what John Milton and John Locke protested against,
and what the First Amendment's speech and press guarantee most
clearly prohibited.' The licensing conducted by IRBs therefore is
so obviously unconstitutional that the federal government ordinar-
ily would not attempt it.
The government, however, imposes the licensing through condi-
tions on government benefits, and it therefore assumes it need not
worry about the First Amendment. The government thereby si-
lences many individuals who fail to get permission or who censor
themselves to get permission; it burdens the class of persons de-
voted to inquiry and scholarship; and it leaves Americans without
the benefit of many empirical academic critiques of government
Hamburger, Getting Permission, supra note 2, at 481-82.
Id. at 412-15, 463-73. States use licensing systems to regulate the use of public
property, such as sidewalks and parks, in ways that may block the mobility of others,
but they cannot do so on account of what is said at such events. Thomas v. Chi. Park
Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002) (upholding non-discriminatory municipal ordinance requir-
ing permit for large events in parks); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)
(upholding convictions of religious protesters for holding a march on sidewalk with-
out a license in violation of non-discriminatory municipal ordinance).36 Hamburger, Getting Permission, supra note 2, at 415-20.
37 John Milton, Areopagitica; A Speech For The Liberty Of Unlicensed Printing To
The Parliament Of England 6-7 (1644); Commons' Resolutions on the Licensing Bill,
in Sources of English Constitutional History 619-21 (Carl Stephenson & Frederick
George Marcham eds., trans., 1937). The Commons' resolutions either were drafted
by Locke or at least were based on his reasoning in a related memorandum. Fredrick
Seaton Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England 1476-1776, at 261 (1952); Raymond
Astbury, The Renewal of the Licensing Act in 1693 and its Lapse in 1695, 33 Library
296, 305, 307, 314-15 (1978). For the point about the First Amendment, see Leonard
W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press 220, 281 (1985).
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policy. Once again, conditions seem to offer a way around the First
Amendment, with the full range of predictable dangers.
Licensing of Airwaves. -A third and final illustration of this
evasion is the federal government's licensing of the airwaves. The
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") allocates airwaves
to broadcasting companies on the condition that they meet a range
of conditions, including the conditions that they not air "obscene"
programming at any time and that they not air "indecent" pro-
gramming or "profane" language during specified hours." Accord-
ingly, if a television or radio station violates this condition, the
FCC can revoke its license or impose lesser consequences, such as
a monetary forfeiture or a warning that can affect the renewal of a
license.
As with the licensing of human-subjects research, the licensing
of the airwaves directly focuses on licensing of speech and the
press, which is a distinctly forbidden method of control. This is not
to say that government cannot sometimes impose after-the-fact
regulation against harms-here, obscenity, indecency, or profanity.
Indeed, the Supreme Court allows some injunctions against words,
and even some licensing against expressive conduct-such as the
images and performances employed in sexually oriented busi-
nesses. But the Court has never held licensing of words to be con-
stitutional, not even when the words are sexual, nor even when
they are combined with images or more generally with conduct.39
" A federal statute specifies criminal penalties for such language. 18 U.S.C. § 1464
(2006) ("Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of ra-
dio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned.., or both."). More
realistically, however, federal regulations enforce this section by means of conditions.
In particular, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2010) enforces 18 U.S.C. § 1464 by providing: "(a)
No licensee of a radio or television broadcast station shall broadcast any material
which is obscene. (b) No licensee of a radio or television broadcast station shall
broadcast on any day between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. any material which is indecent." To
this, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6) (2006) adds "Administrative Sanctions"-namely, that
"[t]he Commission may revoke any station license or construction permit.., for vio-
lation of section 1304, 1343, or 1464 of title 18." Moreover, "[a]ny person who is de-
termined by the Commission... to have ... violated any provision of section 1304,
1343, or 1464 of title 18; shall be liable to the United States for a forfeiture penalty."
47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D) (2006).
"This even is true of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969)
(upholding the fairness doctrine as applied in after-the-fact proceedings against a
broadcaster).
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For example, when dealing with the licensing of pornographic
moving pictures, which combine words and pictures, the Supreme
Court recognizes a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality, and
of course what is really at stake is the licensing of the pictures, not
of the words.' Regardless of the government's power to impose
penalties in after-the-fact proceedings, nothing is more emphati-
cally forbidden than prior review or licensing of words.
The FCC licensing of obscenity, indecency, and profanity there-
fore would ordinarily be unconstitutional. At least to the extent the
FCC licenses words (and the persons and equipment that broad-
cast words), it revives the licensing imposed by the Inquisition and
Star Chamber.41 The government thereby suppresses a mode of
communication with strong political and class affiliations; it si-
lences individual radio hosts; and it confines a powerful avenue of
political criticism. Nonetheless, because the government imposes
the licensing as a condition of what supposedly is a government
benefit, it apparently escapes the First Amendment. 2 Conditions,
again, are a mode of evasion.
'o Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60 (1965) (holding licensing by movie rat-
ings board unconstitutional because of insufficient procedural safeguards). For recent
decisions that apply modified versions of Freedman's procedural requirements to the
licensing of sexually oriented or adult businesses, see City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-
4, 541 U.S. 774, 781-84 (2004); see also FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dall., 493 U.S. 215
(1990). In a recent FCC case, the Court expressly left the First Amendment questions
aside. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009) (upholding FCC's
liability order for fleeting expletives on television).
", The modern licensing of broadcasters is closer to the Star Chamber licensing than
may be realized, for the Star Chamber required licensing not only of what was printed
but also of printers and their means of printing. See supra note 33.
42 As with the restrictions on § 501(c)(3) organizations, there is reason to doubt
whether the underlying government "benefit" is really a benefit-although here for
different reasons. Unlike federal spending or other aid, the airwaves in America have
never been government or public property. Instead, they are common property,
which belongs in common to all Americans. Thus, when allowing access to the air-
waves, the government is not so much distributing benefits, in the sense of govern-
ment property, as allocating access to a scarce shared resource. By analogy, consider
the difference between federal land and the air (in the sense of the nitrogen and oxy-
gen) above the United States. The land is public federal property, which the govern-
ment can grant to persons as it wishes; but the air is common property, in which the
government has no rights to give away. Along the same lines, although the federal
government can allocate or otherwise regulate use of the airwaves, it does not thereby
give or grant the airwaves, for they never belonged to the government in the first
place.
[Vol. 98:479
Unconstitutional Conditions
The evasion is exacerbated by the government's delegation of its
restrictions. In all of the three examples recited here, the govern-
ment does not bring retail proceedings (such as prosecutions, in-
junctions, or libel actions) for individual failures to adhere to its
censorship. Instead, it uses conditions on institutions. It thereby
dispenses with the difficulties of retail proceedings against indi-
viduals for talking and publishing and, instead, by means of delega-
tion, secures wholesale institutional enforcement of its restrictions.
In particular, by shifting away from retail-court proceedings
against individuals, and by using institutions to impose prior licens-
ing, the government reaches not only the institutions but also their
employees and even mere associated persons, and it does so with-
out having to take enforcement measures against the individuals,
let alone with the due process of law. In this efficient wholesale
manner, the government's censorship covers not only churches and
their ministers but also their congregants; not only universities and
their teachers but also their students; not only medical organiza-
tions and their doctors but also their patients; not only charities
and their employees but also their members and volunteers. At
least while such persons are within their institutions, or merely
within the aegis of these institutions, they all are subject to the un-
constitutional restrictions. This is censorship of unprecedented
breadth and depth.
In the end, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the federal
government uses conditions on its benefits to restrict speech and
the press in ways that otherwise would violate the First Amend-
ment-indeed, that have profound consequences for individuals,
vulnerable groups, and the role of speech as a structural limit on
government. These conditions therefore offer a stark reminder of
what is at stake: whether the federal government can evade most of
the Bill of Rights and the other constitutional limits that protect
liberty.
II. CONFUSION
Although consent is central to the debate about unconstitutional
conditions, there is much ambiguity or confusion about why con-
sent matters. The literature on such conditions tends to wrestle
with consent as a generic question. Yet consent arises in at least
three overlapping problems. It therefore is necessary to begin the
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analysis here by untangling the three problems and the role of con-
sent in each of them. In each area of difficulty, consent has a valu-
able role within the law, but this must be distinguished from the
use of consent to legitimize what the government does outside the
law.
A. Consent
The confusion about the constitutionality of conditions arises
most generally from the conflation of two different roles of con-
sent. Within its constitutional authority, the government can use
consent to impose conditions on its benefits, and in this sense, con-
sent is a part of the definition of the government's constitutional
authority. At the same time, consent can be understood as a waiver
or justification of what the government does beyond its constitu-
tional authority. Thus, as already suggested, consent has at least
two roles in relation to conditions: sometimes as a measure of what
the government can do within its constitutional authority, and
sometimes as a waiver or cure for what it does outside such author-
ity.
When consent is a measure of the government's authority, it
surely encounters no constitutional difficulties. The Third
Amendment expressly makes consent a measure of the right it
guarantees: "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the Owner.... "4 3 More generally,
under its powers, the government can impose conditions on its
benefits if it gets consent. The government clearly has authority to
spend under many of its powers, and as part of its spending, it can
offer funding on the condition that recipients consent to its condi-
tions. For example, although the government cannot directly re-
quire a particular graduate student to study physics, it can require
him to study physics as a condition of its funding for his education.
In this role, consent is a mechanism entirely within the scope of the
government's constitutional powers and, indeed, it defines much of
what the government can do.
In contrast to this role of consent within constitutional authority,
however, is a second use of consent, concerning what the govern-
ment does outside its authority-as when it is suggested that con-
" U.S. Const. amend. III.
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sent can waive or cure an unconstitutional condition. It is one thing
for the government, within its powers, to use consent to impose
conditions, but quite another for it to impose a condition that ex-
ceeds such powers or the limits on them. For example, even when
the government has constitutional authority under its powers to
impose consensual-speech restrictions on its distribution of funds,
this does not mean that the consent can justify it in imposing
speech restrictions in violation of the First Amendment. Consent
thus has two roles: first as a means of exercising power within the
government's constitutional authority; second as a means of waiv-
ing or curing an unconstitutional restriction.
It is essential to distinguish these two roles of consent, lest the
first obscure and unjustifiably legitimize the second. The consent
that serves as a mechanism within constitutional authority is not in
doubt. The claim, however, that consent can relieve the govern-
ment of its constitutional limits requires more caution. It therefore
is crucial that the role of consent as a mechanism within the gov-
ernment's constitutional authority should not obscure the problem
of whether consent can cure what the government does outside its
constitutional authority.
B. Consent and Delegation
A secondary point of confusion about consent concerns delega-
tion. When the federal government uses conditions on benefits to
get states and private institutions to impose restrictions on its be-
half, it may be thought that the consensual delegation settles any
constitutional questions. Under such arrangements, the federal
government itself does not impose the unconstitutional restrictions.
Moreover, at least when the federal government acts through pri-
vate institutions, not only the institutions but also their employees
can be assumed to have consented.
The consensual delegation, however, cannot put to rest the ques-
tion of whether the federal government has violated its duties. A
principal cannot avoid a violation of its legal duties by delegating
the violation to an agent, and this remains true regardless of
whether the delegation is consensual. Accordingly, when the fed-
eral government delegates the imposition of unconstitutional re-
strictions-most concretely when it delegates restrictions that vio-
late the limits that cut back on federal powers-the consent to the
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delegation cannot be assumed to settle the question of whether the
federal government has violated its legal duties. The federal gov-
ernment certainly needs consent to delegate the imposition of the
restrictions through states and private institutions, but if the re-
strictions conflict with rights or structural limits, it remains neces-
sary to consider the possibility that the federal government has vio-
lated its constitutional duties. Once again, the role of consent
within the law does not necessarily cure what the government does
outside the law.
C. Consent and Force
Another point of confusion concerns the relationship of consent
to government force. Some constitutional violations involve gov-
ernment force, and confusion arises because it is widely assumed
that where there is consent, there cannot be force-as if consent
and force were two sides of the same coin. Put another way, con-
sent and force often are assumed to be mirror images, thus making
each the measure of the other. This seems to make sense in the ab-
stract, for if a party actually consents to a condition, he has not
been forced, and if he is forced, he has not really consented.
In fact, however, consent does not preclude force. Once one ex-
amines how unconstitutional conditions actually work, it becomes
apparent that the question of consent to a condition is different
from the question of whether the government has applied force.
For example, although the government may obtain consent to a
condition, there remains the possibility that the government in-
duced consent through an exercise of force. Moreover, even if the
government does not use force to induce consent, it remains to be
considered whether, at a later stage, the government relies on its
force to implement the condition.
Thus, when consent and force are presented as an abstract pair,
there is a danger that the emphasis on consent will obscure inquiry
about any concurrent or later force. To be sure, consent is formally
the mechanism by which the government imposes conditions on its
benefits. But the question of force is another matter, which needs
to be evaluated separately.
By avoiding these three points of confusion about consent, this
Article now can sort out unconstitutional conditions. For any re-
striction that goes beyond the government's authority-most con-
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cretely for a restriction that conflicts with the Constitution's rights
or structural limits-it will be seen that consent is no cure. Such
conditions therefore will be analyzed in much the same way as
other government restrictions.
III. CONSENT
The Constitution is a law containing legal limits on government
enacted by the people. Even in most theories of unwritten constitu-
tional change, the adjustments made by judges are said to be con-
stitutionally binding because they have the informal consent of the
people. On such foundations, it becomes apparent that what the
people as a body legislate as limits on government cannot be al-
tered by the consent of any lesser body, whether individuals, pri-
vate institutions, or states. Put another way, their consent cannot
enlarge the government's constitutional power. Thus, if the gov-
ernment goes beyond its constitutional authority in adopting a
condition, consent is no excuse.
Of course, as has been seen, consent can matter within the
sphere of government power. For example, under its powers, the
government can use consent to place conditions on its benefits.
Consent thus defines part of the government's constitutional au-
thority. Yet even though consent is a mechanism within the gov-
ernment's constitutional authority, this is not to say that consent
can excuse what the government does outside its constitutional au-
thority. In this sense, consent is irrelevant.
Although this point applies to all limits on the government, the
emphasis here will be on the enumerated rights. Rights often are
thought to be merely private spheres of freedom, which can be
simply bargained away, and it therefore is important for this Part
to pay special attention to them. 4
"See supra note 4. Although the focus here is on constitutional limits, particularly
constitutional rights, a similar argument could be made about statutory limits on gov-
ernment. Having been imposed by Congress, statutory limits cannot be removed by
personal, institutional, or state consent.
Note that the argument here does not concern inalienability. Rather than rest on
the inalienable character of any particular rights, it rests more generally on the legal
character of the Constitution's limits on government. Inalienable rights are those that
ought not be sacrificed in a constitution, and they raise interesting philosophical ques-
tions about a narrow range of the constitutional rights affected by unconstitutional
conditions. In contrast, constitutional rights are those that are not sacrificed in a con-
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A. Rights as Legal Limits on Government Legislated by the People
Although it is widely assumed that individuals can give up what
is theirs, including their constitutional rights, this misunderstands
the nature of these rights. Such rights are not simply spheres of
freedom but, more specifically, are spheres of freedom legislated
by the people as legal limits on government.
Limits. -Constitutional rights are not only spheres of personal
freedom but also are limits on power. The character of rights as
limits on government often gets forgotten, but it is essential for un-
derstanding constitutional rights and their significance.
Thomas Merrill's work on unconstitutional conditions takes a
step toward recognizing this point, for it begins with the observa-
tion that some constitutional rights are not merely individual in
character. 5 In particular, his work argues that some rights protect
the public interest, and on this basis, he concludes that they can be
waived where private consent would protect the public interest.4
This functionalist justification for the waiver of constitutional
rights does not recognize that all such rights have a public aspect,
let alone that they all limit government. But it at least moves away
from a purely individualistic vision of rights.
In fact, all rights combine personal freedom and governmental
limits. Constitutional rights are areas of personal authority or free-
dom. Whether for individuals or others, they are fields of inde-
pendence, in which persons can make their own choices.
More specifically, however, they are areas of freedom from gov-
ernment, which the Constitution guarantees as limits on the gov-
ernment. This is particularly explicit in the First Amendment,
which begins "Congress shall make no law .... Politically, no
right is more closely associated with personal freedom than the
freedom of speech and the press; philosophically, no right is more
individualistic than the free exercise of religion. The First
Amendment, however, does not speak of individuals or other per-
stitution, and they raise potent legal questions about all rights affected by unconstitu-
tional conditions.
41 Merrill, Dolan, supra note 2, at 869-71.
Id. at 871-72.
,U.S. Const. amend. I.
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sons, but rather declares that "Congress shall make no law ......
Its freedoms thus are express limits on Congress. 9
Most other rights enumerated in the Constitution are stated in
the passive voice, but it is clear that they, too, are framed as limits
on government. For example, the Constitution recites that "[t]he
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended"
and that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed."5 In the Bill of Rights, the Constitution adds guarantees
such as: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated," and "[n]o person shall be held to an-
swer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a pre-
sentment or indictment of a Grand Jury."'" Although these are
spheres of freedom, they are more precisely spheres of freedom
from government.
Not only in its phrasing but even more basically in its structure,
the Constitution guarantees rights as limits on, or exceptions to,
the grants of power. The Constitution, in Article I, section 8, grants
Congress only limited legislative powers. It then further confines
the government's powers by carving out rights-first in Article I,
Section 9, by enumerating rights, and then in the Bill of Rights. As
James Madison explained when he introduced the initial draft of
"' Id. Incidentally, this is also why the government cannot restrict the freedom of
speech to individuals-as when it places limits on the speech of corporations. Being a
limit on government rather than merely a right restricted to individuals, the freedom
of speech cannot be abridged by the government, regardless of the speaker. See, e.g.,
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (holding corporate funding of inde-
pendent political broadcasts to be protected by the First Amendment).
49 of course, especially under an administrative state, the First Amendment is un-
derstood to apply more generally to a wide range of executive actions.
'0 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9. Incidentally, note that the Suspension Clause could have
appeared within the enumeration of powers, but instead was included in the enumera-
tion of rights as part of the definition of the right of habeas. Had the Suspension
Clause been in the enumeration of powers, it would have suggested that, in at least
one instance, a power could trump a right-thus opening up a justification for a sort
of absolute power. The Constitution, however, kept suspension within the definition
of the right of habeas. Thus, even in an apparently small matter, the Constitution con-
sistently kept powers subject to rights.
" U.S. Const. amends. IV, V.
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the Bill of Rights, it would "enumerat[e] particular exceptions to
the grant of power."52
Constitutional rights are thus limits on government powers. The
Constitution initially sketches out the extent and limits of federal
power with the broad brushstrokes of powers, and it then pencils in
more detailed limits with rights.
Legislated by the People. -The Constitution's limits on govern-
ment, including constitutional rights, are not contractual terms, but
rather are legal constraints legislated by the people. They therefore
are legally binding on the government, regardless of any contrary
private or state consent.
In at least some states, when the people made their early consti-
tutions, they were understood to be forming social compacts.53 Si-
multaneously, though, they also were understood to be enacting
their early constitutions as laws, which established and limited their
governments. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 was particu-
larly explicit about this combination of contract and enactment. It
explained in its Preamble that the people were "entering into an
original, explicit, and solemn compact with each other" and were
"forming a new constitution of civil government, for [them]selves
and [their] posterity... ." Accordingly, the people "agree[d]
upon" it as a compact and "ordain[ed] and establish[ed]" it as a
law. ' The constitution thus was simultaneously contract and law.
In 1787, however, it seemed that the society or "union" of the
United States had already been formed by compact-at least at the
2 James Madison, The Congressional Register (June 8, 1789), reprinted in Creating
the Bill of Rights: The Documentary Record from the First Federal Congress 83
(Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991). Similarly, Alexander Hamilton wrote that, "[b]y a
limited constitution I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to
the legislative authority; such for instance as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no
ex post facto laws, and the like." The Federalist No. 78, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton).
Of course, notwithstanding Hamilton's emphasis on exceptions to legislative power,
the U.S. Bill of Rights, like state bills of rights, also included exceptions to executive
and judicial power. This is probably why the first ten amendments to the U.S. Consti-
tution were not ultimately placed within the body of the Constitution, but instead
were added at the end.
" Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty 294-95 (2008) (citing the Georgia, Mas-
sachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Virginia constitutions as exam-
ples).
',Mass. Const. of 1780, pmbl.
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state level in state constitutions and at the federal level in the Arti-
cles of Confederation. As explained by the Philadelphia Conven-
tion's Committee of Detail, "we are not working on the natural
rights of men not yet gathered into society, but upon those rights,
modified by society, and interwoven with what we call the rights of
states."5 The Constitution therefore did not have to say anything
about agreement, which had been the language of the Articles of
Confederation, but instead could rely on the language of enact-
ment: "We the People of the United States, in Order to form a
more perfect Union... do ordain and establish this Constitution
for the United States of America."56 The phrase "ordain and estab-
lish" was a standard formula for the passage of legislation, thus
making clear that the people were not entering a contract, let alone
a contract among the states, but were enacting a law establishing
and limiting the federal government.
This character of the Constitution-as an enacted law rather
than a contract-is profoundly important, not least because it con-
firms that constitutional rights are legally binding limits on gov-
ernment. In defense of slavery, nineteenth-century Southerners in-
sisted that the U.S. Constitution was merely a compact-indeed,
merely a compact among the states-thus laying the foundation for
the Southern argument that the states, as parties to the Constitu-
tion, could in some circumstances abandon it.
These days, with even less coherent logic, it is suggested that in-
dividuals, institutions, and states, by their consent, can relieve the
federal government of the limits imposed on it by the Constitution.
Constitutional rights, however, are not private rights, which the
rights holders can barter away or otherwise relinquish as they
please. On the contrary, they are legal limits legislated by the peo-
ple, and this has implications for the significance of consent.
" Edmund Randolph, Draft Sketch of Constitution, in The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, Supplementary Vol. 183 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987).
56 U.S. Const. pmbl. In contrast, the Articles of Confederation did not include such
language. Articles of Confederation of 1781.
17 Hamburger, supra note 53, at 294.
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B. State and Private Consent Irrelevant
Being laws-indeed, laws enacted by the people-the constitu-
tional limits on the federal government, including constitutional
rights, cannot be changed or relaxed by state or private consent.
Put concretely, consent cannot enlarge federal power. In this re-
spect, consent does not matter.
The people as a body adopted the Constitution as a law limiting
government, and therefore although the people can enact changes
in the Constitution, individuals, states, and other bodies less than
the people cannot relieve the government of its limits or duties un-
der the Constitution. For example, even when an individual
chooses not to exercise her right to speak or seek habeas, the gov-
ernment remains confined by the Constitution's prohibitions
against abridging speech or denying habeas. The individual's relin-
quishment of her rights does not create a corresponding power in
government."
Of course, private rights can be sacrificed by private consent.
But constitutional limits, including constitutional rights, do not be-
long to persons in the same way as private rights. Instead, constitu-
tional rights are legal limits on government imposed by the people,
and therefore no amount of consent by individuals, institutions, or
states can relieve the federal government of these limits. In per-
sonal terms, although an individual may choose not to exercise a
"There is an analogy in the constitutional doctrine on sovereign power that devel-
oped around the Dartmouth College Case. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). Put simply, the doctrine clarified that, even when the govern-
ment enters contracts, it retains its sovereign power. As explained by the Supreme
Court, "[t]he government purely as contractor, in the absence of special laws, may
stand like a private person; but, by making a contract, it does not give up its power to
make a law," including a law which renders criminal a breach of contract. Ellis v.
United States, 206 U.S. 246, 256 (1907) (upholding statutory eight-hour limits for la-
borers and mechanics employed by the United States or its contractors).
Another analogy concerns the notion that the acquiescence of one branch of gov-
ernment in an exercise of power by another can shift constitutional authority. Al-
though this sort of conclusion tends to be understood in terms of separation of powers
rather than unconstitutional conditions, it points to a similar problem of consent. In
this instance, how can the consent of one part of government enlarge the power of
another part? Although there remain questions about the power of the branches to
decide constitutional questions for themselves, the mere consent of a branch cannot
alter the constitutionally demarcated lines of power any more than can the consent of
individuals or states.
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constitutional right, she cannot by means of her consent authorize
the government to exercise any power denied to it by the people's
enumeration of the right. 9
Thus, if the government violates a right or any other constitu-
tional limitation, it cannot escape these constitutional limits by get-
ting consent. It may be able to get the consent of churches and ra-
dio stations to restrictions on their political speech, and the consent
of universities to restrictions on their academic speech, but if the
restrictions are otherwise unconstitutional, they remain unconstitu-
tional even when the government gets consent.
The argument can be put in other ways. For example, in terms of
authority, the obligation of the Constitution, including its enumera-
tion of rights, is based on the authority of the people, and because
mere states and private bodies do not have the authority to change
this law, its limits remain binding regardless of any amount of state
or private authorization. In political terms, private consent cannot
defeat public law; or, from the other direction, the government
cannot make a separate peace with some Americans to escape the
limits imposed by and for all Americans. In terms of corruption,
the government cannot free itself from the constitutional duties it
owes to the people as a whole by bribing states or private parties
into acquiescence. In terms of equality, the Constitution is a law
uniformly binding on government with respect to all the people,
regardless of the government's power to purchase the subordina-
tion of groups within the people. In terms of public-choice theory,
the non-tradable character of constitutional rights stands as an ob-
stacle to the tragedy of the commons, for it bars attempts at a divi-
sion of constitutional spoils in which the shared character of consti-
tutional rights is lost because some Americans are willing to sell
their freedom.
It may be assumed that one should distinguish between the
waiver of a right and the waiver of an exercise of the right, and cer-
"The word "consent" is used here broadly to cover not only the sort of consent in-
volved in contracts but also in other consensual arrangements, and this is consistent
with the policy of the federal government, which is sometimes careful to emphasize
that its conditions do not arise out of contracts. For example, under the regulations on
human subjects, a research institution does not enter a contract with the government
about its use of IRBs, but rather gives the government an "assurance." Such distinc-
tions, however, are not significant for the analysis here, which deals with the full
range of consensual arrangements resting on unconstitutional conditions.
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tainly this is an interesting problem. It soon, indeed, becomes
metaphysical.' But the question here is not so difficult, for rather
than concerning the waiver or forfeiture of a private right, it con-
cerns the limits that the people impose on the federal government
through their law. Once the question is understood in this way, it
becomes clear that no amount of consent to a condition can defeat
the enactment of the Constitution. Thus, although individuals, in-
stitutions, and states can decline to exercise their liberty, the law
enacted by the people remains binding on the federal government,
and no amount of individual, institutional, or state consent can re-
lax its obligation to obey that law.
This is why, incidentally, it does not matter whether the consent
comes through a conscious waiver or a less conscious forfeiture.
Regardless of consent or other intent, a person's failure to exercise
her right cannot give government a power that the law denies to
government.
This irrelevance of consent even extends to takings of land and
other things that ordinarily could be relinquished by consent. Con-
sider, for example, the following scenario. The Connecticut legisla-
ture passes an act taking land belonging to S and giving it to W.
When S sues W for the land, W protests that S acquiesced in the
legislative act. S responds, however, that notwithstanding its acqui-
escence, the legislature lacked the constitutional power to take its
property. Far from being merely a hypothetical illustration, this is
roughly the Symsbury Case-a 1785 decision detailed in Appendix
A. What matters here is that, although the town of Symsbury could
consent to give up its land, its consent could not give the legislature
the power to take the land. It therefore is no surprise that the Con-
necticut Superior Court upheld the rights of Symsbury against
claims derived from the town of Windsor. As in Nollan and Dolan,
which will be discussed in Part VII, consent is no cure."
60 At common law, such questions were addressed with greater clarity in the distinc-
tion between particular rights and common or general rights. See, e.g., Norris v. Staps
(C.P. 1616), 80 Eng. Rep. 357, 358 (distinguishing "particular privileges" from the
"general liberties of the people"). The point here is that the latter cannot be waived.
61 Other historical examples of the irrelevance of consent can be observed in the ju-
dicial decisions holding that the consent of parties cannot justify judges stepping out-
side their office or even their jurisdiction. For example, judges traditionally could not
enter a consent decree or other judgment "which they kn[e]w would be against the
Law, altho' the Plaintiff and Defendant d[idl agree to have such a Judgment given."
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The irrelevance of consent may seem surprising. Certainly, it
does not fit with the common assumption that consent is the key to
understanding unconstitutional conditions. The Constitution, how-
ever, is a law which comes from the people, and therefore no con-
sent from individuals, institutions, or states can relieve the federal
government of the Constitution's limits. For such purposes, con-
sent is irrelevant.
IV. DELEGATION
Just as consent is no cure, so too delegation is no cure. The fed-
eral government sometimes asks states and private institutions that
receive federal benefits to restrict persons subject to their con-
trol-indeed, sometimes to restrict them in ways that confine their
constitutional rights. This delegation of the task of imposing un-
constitutional restrictions may be thought to help the federal gov-
ernment avoid its constitutional limits. In fact, however, as is famil-
iar from the law of agency, the delegation cannot relieve the
federal government of its legal duties. Like other principals that
delegate acts to agents, the federal government cannot escape its
legal limitations by asking others to act on its behalf.
A. Dangers of Delegation
Before showing that the federal government cannot avoid its
constitutional duties by delegating unconstitutional acts to agents,
this Section must draw attention to the dangers of delegation. To
John Lilly, 2 The Practical Register 98 (London, E. Nutt et al. eds., 1735) (citing a
King's Bench case of 1671). Similarly, "the admittance of a party cannot give jurisdic-
tion to a court where it has none, and the proceeding is coram non judice." Nathan
Dane, 3 A General Abridgment and Digest of American Law 65 (Boston, Cummings,
Hilliard & Co., 1824). Indeed, "if the court of Admiralty have no jurisdiction origi-
nally, its sentence is void, and the party may avail himself of it at any time." Id. (Of
course, for reasons that will be discussed below in Section VII.C, the reasoning about
jurisdiction did not preclude personal jurisdiction to the extent this was a matter of
due process and there was no constitutionally significant force.)
Overall, the point is that consent cannot expand the power with which a court is
constituted. In the nineteenth century, this sometimes was discussed in terms of a
technical difference between nullities and irregularities, the former being void even
where there was consent. H. McNamara, A Practical Treatise on Nullities and Irregu-
larities in Law, Their Character, Distinctions, and Consequences 20 (Philadelphia, T.
& J.W. Johnson, 1855). The underlying principle, however, is that private consent
cannot enlarge public power.
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some observers, the use of a condition to delegate enforcement of
an unconstitutional restriction may seem just another sort of un-
constitutional condition. It is, however, a particularly dangerous
use of conditions, for it shortcuts consent and exaggerates en-
forcement. Although neither point is a necessary foundation for
the constitutional argument here, these dangers suggest why the
use of conditions to delegate unconstitutional restrictions deserves
particular attention.
Delegation Shortcuts Consent. -The use of conditions to get
private institutions and the states to carry out unconstitutional re-
strictions has the effect of cutting short consent. This in itself is not
a constitutional problem, for as has been seen, consent is no cure.
But the truncation of consent suggests the brazen character of the
government's delegation, and it should be particularly worrisome
to those persons who still adhere to the conventional view that un-
constitutional conditions are justified by consent.
The familiar problem with the use of conditions to delegate un-
constitutional restrictions is that the restricted persons are merely
presumed to give their consent. In a simple unconstitutional condi-
tion, the federal government obtains the consent of the restricted
persons. But where the government delegates restrictions through
conditions on states and private institutions, the government
merely gets the consent of the bodies that impose the restrictions.
On the conventional assumption that consent is a cure, it com-
monly is said that the consent of the individuals within an institu-
tion can be implied from their willingness to remain employed by,
or otherwise attached to, the institution. In other words, if they do
not like the regulations imposed in response to the condition, they
can leave their institution. Certainly, some individual consent can
be implied from institutional consent. Nonetheless, the presump-
tion of consent makes the notion of consent rather attenuated, and
this is an initial ground for concern.
More seriously, the presumption of consent entirely collapses
when the federal government asks not merely private institutions,
but states to impose unconstitutional restrictions. Even if the con-
sent of individuals were a cure, it is implausible to suggest that per-
sons within a state have consented to relinquish their constitutional
rights merely by remaining within the state. It is one thing to say
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that employees have no right to their jobs and that therefore, if
they remain in their jobs, they impliedly consent to any sacrifice of
their freedom required by the federal government in exchange for
its financing of their employer. But it does not follow that indi-
viduals in a state impliedly consent to an unconstitutional federal
condition merely because they do not exercise their right of exit.
Persons who are lawfully in a state have a right to remain there
without thereby being presumed to have consented to a sacrifice of
their constitutional rights. Thus, even if consent were a cure, the
consent theory fails on its own terms when the federal government
asks states to impose unconstitutional restrictions on persons
within their jurisdictions.
Of course, this is not a necessary foundation for the argument
here, which is that the consent of a state cannot relieve the federal
government of its constitutional limits. It is a reminder, however,
that the use of conditions to delegate unconstitutional restrictions
tends to undermine the consent that is said to justify these condi-
tions.
Delegation Exaggerates Enforcement. -Delegation also has
troubling consequences for the enforcement of conditions; in par-
ticular, it exaggerates the enforcement of unconstitutional restric-
tions. Again, this is not a necessary basis for the argument here,
but it suggests why the conditions that ask states and private insti-
tutions to impose unconstitutional restrictions require special at-
tention.
The first and most general enforcement danger from the delega-
tion of unconstitutional restrictions is that it allows the federal
government to leverage its power. By getting states and institutions
to control individuals, the government can extend the reach of its
unconstitutional conditions, relying on the consent of a relatively
small number of intermediaries to impose unconstitutional restric-
tions on vast numbers of individuals.
Second, when the federal government acts through states and in-
stitutions, it subjects individuals to the coordinated effect of multi-
ple layers of power-federal, state, and corporate. Whereas these
entities ordinarily would act independently, the federal govern-
ment uses its purchasing power to ensure that they collaborate in
pursuit of conduct barred to the federal government by the Consti-
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tution. The layered character of the American political and social
system traditionally allowed individuals to find some refuge, for
themselves and their liberty, in the different stances taken by dif-
ferent governments and different institutions. Through its use of
conditions on benefits, however, the federal government increas-
ingly aligns the police power of the states and the economic power
of private institutions to create a uniform phalanx of public and
private power in pursuit of unconstitutional restrictions-a phalanx
that discourages individuals from resisting. This consolidated en-
forcement is bad enough from the perspective of federalism be-
cause it reduces states and private institutions to federal agents or
administrative agencies. Its implications for individual liberty,
however, are even more worrisome.
Third, almost all delegated unconstitutional restrictions are en-
forced without the due process that the government would have to
offer if it were imposing the restrictions directly. The loss of due
process already is serious under regular conditions, for these often
are enforced merely in administrative proceedings. The loss of
process, however, is far worse when the federal government asks
states and private institutions to impose unconstitutional restric-
tions. In such instances, there often is no due process at all; indeed,
there is the very opposite of due process.
Consider, for example, how the government nowadays controls
speech-not in its own retail court proceedings, but wholesale
through delegation. The government once had to proceed against
persons individually in court by seeking an injunction or bringing a
prosecution, with a jury and all of the other due process of law.
Now, however, the government uses its conditions to delegate the
dirty work to its agents, thus allowing it to control speech on a
massive scale for which due process would be impracticable. As a
result of the conditions, radio and television stations respond to
FCC warnings about their licenses by instructing their hosts to tone
down what they say; churches respond to IRS threats about their
tax exemptions by telling their ministers not to speak from the pul-
pit about election politics; university IRBs comply with HHS regu-
lations by reviewing and censoring what scholars and students say
and publish-all of which is done without due process. Although
the IRBs impose their licensing more or less continuously, even
they offer no due process; on the contrary, IRBs act in secret meet-
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ings, without a jury, without a hearing, without lawyers, or even
any appeal to a court of law.62 Thus, in a wide range of circum-
stances, when the government delegates unconstitutional restric-
tions, it can shift from retail to wholesale suppression, thereby
evading not only the freedom of speech but also due process.'
62 See Hamburger, Getting Permission, supra note 2, at 426. It therefore is not sur-
prising that faculty and students are afraid even to complain, except with anonymity,
for they fear that their IRB will respond by arbitrarily denying them further permis-
sion to inquire and publish. Id. at 426 n.58; Cary Nelson, Can E.T. Phone Home? The
Brave New World of University Surveillance, Academe, Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 30, 35.
The lack of due process goes so far as to include requirements that researchers con-
fess their violations. For example, the conditions on research institutions under the
human-subjects research regulations ordinarily include self-reporting requirements,
such as "written procedures for ensuring prompt reporting to the IRB, appropriate
institutional officials, and the department or agency head of... any unanticipated
problems involving risks to subjects or others or any serious or continuing noncom-
pliance with this policy or the requirements or determinations of the IRB .... " 45
C.F.R. § 46.103(b)(5). With such conditions, the government creates an atmosphere in
which self-denunciation is expected and a failure promptly to volunteer one's viola-
tions can lead to IRB or government sanctions.
The pressure for self-denunciation usually is felt in rather informal ways. IRBs fre-
quently adjust the severity of their licensing depending on whether the individuals are
sufficiently "cooperative" and "submissive" toward the IRB. The justification is that
uncooperative persons are apt to pose a greater risk, and IRBs therefore feel free on
such grounds to deny permission to inquire or publish. See generally Robert J. Le-
vine, Ethics and Regulation of Clinical Research 27 (2d ed. 1986); Hamburger, Get-
ting Permission, supra note 2, at 426. Accordingly, when individuals fail to comply
with any IRB limitation, they feel obliged, and sometimes are candidly instructed, to
be "cooperative" and "submissive."
63 Making matters worse, the federal government uses its delegation at many institu-
tions not only to exercise an exaggerated enforcement power but also to enforce ex-
aggerated unconstitutional restrictions. Under highly restrictive and cross-
collateralized conditions, there will always be someone at an institution who is out of
compliance, and this gives the government the power to declare, at any time, at al-
most any federally funded institution, that the institution has forfeited all benefits re-
ceived or receivable under current grants. For example, under human-subjects re-
search regulations, the government can, more or less at its discretion, shut down
entire institutions, stopping the work, including the inquiry and publication, of all per-
sons associated with the institution. This is a formidable power, and after exercising it
in a small number of institutions, thereby intimidating the others, the government
now typically need only hint that it might shut down an institution. It uses this quiet
bullying not only to enforce its conditions but also to impose a wide range of addi-
tional restrictions that are not required by law, that do not comply with the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, and that, in some instances, are clearly unconstitutional. For
example, the government pressures universities to require students and faculty to un-
dergo "education" or indoctrination before they may begin their inquiries or publish
on the basis of them.
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It thus should be apparent that, both in undermining consent
and in exaggerating enforcement, the conditions that delegate en-
forcement of unconstitutional restrictions are unusually dangerous.
Although the mere dangers of such conditions do not make them
unconstitutional, the dangers suggest why it is important to focus
on the delegation and to understand that it is no cure.
B. Delegation to an Agent No Cure for the Principal
When the federal government uses conditions to delegate un-
constitutional restrictions, does it successfully wiggle out from un-
der its legal limits? To take the most clear-cut example, can the
federal government evade the limits on its powers-that is, can it
evade the Constitution's rights and structural limits-merely by
persuading someone else to do the prohibited acts? The answer is
evident from a basic point of the law of agency.
Principal and Agent. -A foundational maxim of agency law re-
cites, qui facit per alium facit per se-meaning that "what a man
does by another, he does by himself."' As restated in another
maxim, nam qui facit per alium, facit per se, "he who acts through
another does the act himself."65 In other words, when a person is
barred by law from doing an act, he cannot avoid his legal duty by
asking someone else to do the prohibited act for him.
The logic of qui facit is based on causation. A person who uses a
mechanical instrument to do a legally significant act cannot claim
that the act is not hers. By the same token, when she uses another
person to do the act, she cannot disown it. Thus, she cannot ordi-
Indeed, the government's enforcement power is so overwhelming that it sometimes
creates a cascade of exaggerated restrictions. Fearful of losing funding on account of a
minor slip-up by a single person, institutions often enforce restrictive conditions with
such vigilance as to demand more from their personnel than the federal government
requires. And their administrators protect themselves by imposing yet more restric-
tive measures-all in the name of enforcing federal conditions. As a result, persons
associated with funded institutions often are under institutional and bureaucratic
pressure, without due process, to conform to restrictions that exceed what is stated in
the government's conditions.
6 For this maxim, see Thomas Branch, Principia Legis et iEquitatis: Being an Al-
phabetical Collection of Maxims, Principles or Rules, Definitions, and Memorable
Sayings, in Law and Equity 122 (Richmond, William Waller Hening ed., T. W. White
1824).
65 For this maxim, see 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *462.
Unconstitutional Conditions
narily escape a legal obstacle by asking another to act in her stead;
on the contrary, she is usually understood to have acted unlawfully.
This point should not be confused with the more familiar rule,
which works in reverse, holding the principal vicariously liable for
her agent's violation of his legal duties. That reverse liability, which
is standard fare in tort and criminal law, does not apply in constitu-
tional law, for reasons discussed in Appendix B. Here, it should be
enough to recognize that, for purposes of constitutional law, a
principal cannot avoid her violation of her duties by acting through
an agent.
In soliciting the action of an agent, it obviously is irrelevant
whether the principal induces cooperation by means of a threat of
penalty or a promise of benefits. For example, although a principal
can threaten an agent to get cooperation, she can also simply offer
a commission. Indeed, consensual dealing rather than threat is the
normal way of getting things done, and it provides no excuse for a
person who uses someone else to do what she is legally barred
from doing. Delegation is no cure, however it is accomplished.
Of course, some legal limits narrowly confine only the principal,
not agents, and under such a limit, the principal can ask an agent to
act for her without violating her legal duty. For example, even if
state law bars pregnant women from drinking more than one bottle
of beer a day, a pregnant woman can lawfully encourage her hus-
band to drink an extra glass on her behalf. This sort of limitation
merely protects the limited person (or, in the pregnant-woman ex-
ample, the potential person within her), and thus even if her hus-
band were considered her agent, she would not have violated the
law.
Many legal limitations, however, including constitutional limita-
tions, confine persons in order to protect others. For example, the
Constitution limits the government so as to protect the people. As
a result, it makes no difference for purposes of constitutional law
whether the government violates its constitutional limits directly or
whether it does so through states or private institutions.
It thus becomes apparent that the federal government cannot
escape its legal duties by asking others to do what it cannot. For
example, if the federal government takes a person's property, it
does not matter whether a government official seizes it with his
own hands or whether he hires an agent or an independent con-
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tractor to carry out the seizure.' Regardless, the federal govern-
ment has committed an unlawful taking. Similarly, if the federal
government imposes licensing of speech and the press, it makes no
difference whether it does this by itself or by delegating the task to
others, whether states or private institutions. 7 For purposes of the
delegated conduct, the federal government is a principal, and the
state or private institution is an agent. It therefore is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that the federal government is violating the
Constitution.
The Underlying Problem of Evasion. -Far from being merely a
matter of doctrine, the principle drawn from agency law matters as
a structural response to evasion. Consider the risks: Can persons
evade their legal duties by asking others to act for them? Or, for
that matter, can the others evade their legal duties by being asked
to act? If so, neither principal nor agent is subject to law.
Once this threat of evasion is understood, it becomes clear that
the qui facit principle is essential for preventing the evasion of legal
duties. In particular, the principle is essential for preventing gov-
ernments from brushing aside their constitutional duties. Although
the federal government often will ask a state to do what the federal
government cannot do under the Federal Constitution, does this
consensual delegation relieve both governments of their constitu-
tional limits-thus leaving neither responsible and everyone else
vulnerable? Merely to ask the question goes a long way toward an-
swering it.
The danger of allowing government to escape its constitutional
limits by means of delegation has been all too familiar in America.
When local sheriffs in the old West, or the early twentieth-century
South, wanted to act unlawfully but without responsibility, they
delegated their beatings and other unlawful acts to local thugs.
This vigilante justice was sometimes known as "regulation"-it be-
6 The distinction between an agent and an independent contractor is apt to matter
for the reverse attribution of liability in tort law-for example, if A hires B, a forklift
truck operator, to take C's property, and B, in the course of taking the property, neg-
ligently kills a bystander, D. But neither the question of liability, nor the distinction
between an agent and an independent contractor, is relevant to the question here,
which is whether A has departed from her own legal duties. For the reverse attribu-
tion of liability, see Appendix B.
67 The historical foundation for this point is discussed infra note 92.
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ing said, for example, that the Ku Klux Klan would "regulate" fel-
low citizens.' Although this sort of regulation is bad enough when
done entirely on private initiative, it is especially dangerous when
carried out on behalf of the government or its officers.
To take another example, the federal government can be com-
pared to a community-minded individual--call him "Carmine"-
who owns a restaurant.69 Carmine regularly uses the profits of this
lawful business to support another well-meaning individual, "Joe,"
and asks little in return other than an occasional public service, in
which Carmine expects Joe to "regulate" persons who get out of
line-for example, persons who cheat Carmine or fail to show ade-
quate respect. Does this arrangement absolve Carmine, let alone
Joe, of his legal duties?
And how is it different when Congress or an executive official
requires either a state or a private institution, as condition of a
grant, to do what is forbidden by the Constitution's rights or struc-
tures-not to mention what is forbidden to the state by its state bill
of rights, the incorporated Bill of Rights, and a range of civil rights
laws? Is the federal government or anyone else really relieved of
its legal limits by the delegation?
Although the evasion of constitutional limits is clear, so is the so-
lution in the qui facit principle. When the federal government gets
states or private institutions to implement what the federal gov-
"Regulation" thus has been defined as "[t]he mode or practice of policing or gov-
erning a society through regulators"-as when it was said in 1837 that "[t]he outrages
of the borderers-the frontier law of 'regulation' or 'lynching' which is common to
new counties all over the world, are ascribed to slavery." A Dictionary of American-
isms on Historical Principles 1381 (Mitford M. Mathews ed., 1956).
An illustration of this usage within the Klan comes from Hugo Black. He was the
third in command of the most influential Klavern in the United States, the Robert E.
Lee Klan No. 1, and in 1926 he was the Klan's candidate in the Alabama Senate pri-
mary. After his victory, which virtually assured him a seat in the Senate, the Robert
E. Lee Klan No. 1 held a "Klorero" to celebrate his victory, and at this event the fu-
ture Senator and Associate Justice told his fellow Klansmen: "The great thing I like
about this organization is not the burning of crosses, it is not attempting to regulate
anybody-I don't know, some may do that-but my friends, I see a bigger vision, I
see a vision of America honored by the nations of the world." Ray Sprigle, Black's
Loyalty to Klan Shown in Fervid Pledge, Pittsburg Post-Gazette, Sept. 15, 1937, at 2.
See, for example, Carmine Galante, a.k.a. "The Cigar," head of the Bonanno
crime family from the mid-1970s until his assassination in 1979. Carl Sifakis, The Ma-
fia Encyclopedia 176-77 (3d ed. 2005).
2012]
Virginia Law Review
ernment itself cannot lawfully do, the federal government does not
thereby avoid its legal duties; on the contrary, it violates them.
Extent of Delegation. -That delegation to an agent is not a cure
becomes particularly evident when one realizes that almost all gov-
ernment action is delegated. The government regularly delegates
its actions, both within the government and outside, thus revealing
a continuum of delegation in which the government does not es-
cape its constitutional duties.
Most acts by government officers are not formally acts of the
United States. Acts of Congress and some acts of the President are
acts of the United States. The rest of federal action, however, is
done by officers of the United States, usually inferior officers, who
act as agents of the United States. Thus, even within the govern-
ment, most action is delegated.
Inferior officers, moreover, often hire outsiders to do work for
the United States. Such arrangements ordinarily require the out-
siders merely to do what the government itself also can lawfully
do-such as cleaning government buildings, distributing govern-
ment census forms, running research laboratories, or manufactur-
ing weapons. There thus are layers of delegation, reaching down to
inferior officers and then to persons outside the government.
Both the officers and outsiders, moreover, can be agents of the
United States. Not only when an officer of the United States is act-
ing for the United States, but also when an outsider is acting by re-
quest of the United States, that individual is an agent for purposes
of the qui facit principle.
These layers are revealing, for they are a reminder that most of
the acts by which the United States can violate the law are not
formally acts of the United States. On the contrary, the govern-
ment acts that violate the law are mostly done by delegation-
sometimes within the government, and sometimes outside. For ex-
ample, the government can order its own officers to carry out an
uncompensated taking, or it can hire a private company to do it;
but either way, the government will have delegated the taking, and
in neither case does this mean that the government did not violate
the Fifth Amendment.
Whether the government relies on its own officers or on outside
entities, it delegates most of its unconstitutional conduct, and the
[Vol. 98:479
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difference is merely in the reach of the delegation. It thus becomes
clear that delegation is irrelevant.
Delegation No Cure for Direct Violations of Law by States and
Private Institutions. -Before concluding this analysis of delega-
tion, Part IV must note a critical adjacent point. Although the
question here is whether delegation can cure the federal govern-
ment's violation of its own constitutional duties, this usually is ac-
companied by the question of whether the delegation can be an ex-
cuse for states and private institutions that, when carrying out the
requested acts, end up directly violating their own legal limits. Al-
though this is not an unconstitutional conditions question, it is apt
to be of profound importance in litigation over unconstitutional
conditions, and it therefore is discussed in Appendix C. Suffice it to
say here, just as delegation cannot excuse the principal's violation
of its duties, so too it cannot excuse an agent's violation of its du-
ties.
The main question here, however, is the more complex problem
of the federal government's violations of its own duties. As by now
should be evident, when the federal government delegates the en-
forcement of unconstitutional restrictions, it violates its own consti-
tutional limits. Most concretely, the government cannot rely on
delegation to excuse its imposition of restrictions that otherwise
would violate the Constitution's rights or structural limits.
V. FORCE
When the excuses of consent and delegation are stripped away,
all that is left is the question of force. Although force is not an ele-
ment of all constitutional violations, it is an element of some, in-
cluding violations of most constitutional rights. It therefore is es-
sential to recognize that, even with consent, many of the
unconstitutional conditions that restrict rights come with constitu-
tionally significant government force.
The question of consent tends to be confused with the question
of force, but in fact they are quite different. If consent is no cure
for an unconstitutional government act, then the question-at least
in rights cases-is not whether there is consent to a restriction, but
rather whether the restriction comes with government force.
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This is not as difficult a question as may be supposed, for al-
though force can be intertwined with consent at the inducement
stage, it presents no difficulties at the implementation stage. It
therefore is essential in this Part to distinguish between conditions
that amount to an immediate sacrifice of liberty and those that
bind into the future. When the government obtains an immediate
sacrifice of liberty, the question is whether the government relied
on mere force to induce consent, and this can be a complicated in-
quiry. When the government, however, secures conditions with
commitments into the future, it relies on the force of law to imple-
ment the conditions, thus making the question of force much easier
to resolve.7"
A. Immediate Sacrifices of Liberty: Induced by Mere Force?
Some government conditions require an immediate sacrifice of
liberty-that is, they require a current relinquishment of rights, not
any commitment into the future. In such instances, the government
has no need to rely on the force of law to implement its conditions,
and the question therefore comes to rest on the pressure or mere
force used by the government to induce consent. Obviously, it can
be difficult to determine whether this pressure is so strong as to be
constitutionally significant.
7 Incidentally, conditions violating constitutional rights can be void even without
government force. The government emphasizes that its conditions are not require-
ments of law, but simply are consensual conditions on grants. In the law on consen-
sual arrangements between private parties, however, conditions are void if contrary to
law; indeed, they are void if contrary merely to public policy. Thus, even without gov-
ernment force, a government condition imposing censorship or otherwise violating a
constitutional right surely should be considered void and unenforceable. See also su-
pra note 8 and infra note 77.
In this connection, note that here, too, consent is of no avail. Speaking of unlawful
contracts, the Supreme Court has summarized:
In such cases there can be no waiver. The defense is allowed, not for the sake of
the defendant, but of the law itself. The principle is indispensable to the purity
of its administration. It will not enforce what it has forbidden and de-
nounced .... Whenever the illegality appears ... the disclosure is fatal to the
case. No consent of the defendant can neutralize its effect. A stipulation in the
most solemn form to waive the objection, would be tainted with the vice of the
original contract, and void for the same reasons. Wherever the contamination
reaches, it destroys. The principle to be extracted from all the cases is, that the
law will not lend its support to a claim founded upon its violation.
Coppell v. Hall, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 542, 558-59 (1868).
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Regulatory Conditions. -One solution is to differentiate condi-
tions that are regulatory from those that simply define grants or
purchases. The distinction between regulatory and spending condi-
tions has been widely embraced in the literature on unconstitu-
tional conditions, but without a recognition that its primary value is
for evaluating the conditions that require an immediate sacrifice of
liberty.' As to these, there is no later government force and thus
no force of law, but only the mere force or pressure used to induce
consent. In this context, the best way to evaluate whether there has
been constitutionally significant coercion is to consider whether the
condition is regulatory.
Of course, this sort of analysis assumes a connection between
regulation and a coercive inducement. Just because a condition is
regulatory, does it really follow that the pressure used to induce
consent was coercive? In theory, one might assume not. But as a
practical matter the regulatory function of a condition is at least a
prima facie indicator that the government has induced acceptance
of the condition with what amounts to regulatory or coercive pres-
sure.
Although the distinction between a regulatory and a non-
regulatory condition can be elusive, the facts often eliminate the
difficulties. The government sometimes bluntly says that it is using
its conditions as a mode of regulation. Less directly, but no less
clearly, it sometimes imposes conditions that are disproportionate,
non-germane, or otherwise "off." For example, it sometimes gives
its conditions a regulatory effect by spreading out its funding
among many recipients, by imposing overbroad restrictions, by re-
stricting activities not closely related to the spending, or by lever-
aging funding of one project, subject matter, or person to impose
conditions on others. In such circumstances, the conditions evi-
dently are regulatory.
The regulatory nature of a condition suggests that the induce-
ment went beyond what was necessary for an ordinary and lawful
purchase. For example, where the government requires a public
teacher, as a condition of her employment, to give up not only her
irrelevant speech in the classroom but also her general political
speech outside the school, the restriction clearly is non-germane, or
" See supra note 2.
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at least disproportionate, and thus regulatory. The government is
unlikely to have obtained such a restriction without offering an in-
ducement beyond what would have been necessary for obtaining a
non-regulatory restriction, and at least in this sense, the govern-
ment appears to have relied on regulatory pressures. The existence
of a regulatory condition thereby suggests that the inducement
amounted to the sort of pressure necessary to impose regulation,
and this is at least a prima facie sign of constitutionally significant
coercion.
Non-Regulatory Conditions. -Of course, even where conditions
are not regulatory, the force used for inducement can be constitu-
tionally significant. For example, where the government uses du-
ress to obtain consent to a restriction on speech, it surely is violat-
ing the First Amendment, regardless of whether the restriction is
not regulatory. Government duress, however, rarely is overt.
Therefore, in the absence of regulatory conditions, it often is diffi-
cult to sort out whether the force inducing non-regulatory condi-
tions is constitutionally significant.
B. Conditions Binding into the Future: Implemented by the Force of
Law
In contrast to the conditions that merely require a current sacri-
fice of liberty are the conditions that bind into the future. The gov-
ernment in these conditions secures legally binding commitments
into the future. Thus, regardless of any question about force in the
inducement, these conditions always come with the force of law at
the later implementation stage.
Of course, the force of law underlying these forward-looking
conditions is more collateral than direct, for the conditions them-
selves are not legally obligatory. Nonetheless, breaches of the con-
ditions are subject to legally binding duties, thus allowing the gov-
ernment to take legal action against defaulters. Consequently,
although the conditions are not legally binding, they are supported
by the force of law.
Suppose, for example, the federal government were to make
grants to impecunious professors at private colleges, on the condi-
tion that the professors not publish academic articles criticizing fel-
low citizens without first getting their written permission. On ac-
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count of both the content discrimination and the requirement of
prior licensing, this restriction violates the First Amendment, but
only if the government acts with force. Although the conditions
themselves are not obligatory or enforceable, they are tied by con-
sent to the government's grant of benefits. As a result, if the re-
cipients of the benefits breach the conditions, they have a legally
obligatory and enforceable duty to return the benefits. It thus does
not matter whether the conditions themselves are legally binding;
they are backed by the force of law and thus are unconstitutional.
A recognition of context is all that is necessary to understand
this collateral force of law. Standing alone, a condition that binds
into the future will not seem legally obligatory or enforceable. But
one cannot rest with this conclusion unless one takes an artificially
narrow vision, which ignores the rest of the transaction. In both
form and reality, the transaction includes not only a restriction on
the recipient of government funding, but also a legally binding and
enforceable claim against him if he fails to conform. Thus, when
the condition is considered in the context of the entire transaction,
there is no doubt that it is supported by the force of law.72
72To protect its unconstitutional conditions, the government could avoid the force
of law that underlies conditions running into the future by shifting to conditions that
merely involve an immediate sacrifice of liberty. This evasion, however, would not be
entirely successful.
The evasion itself is simple. If courts come to recognize that unconstitutional condi-
tions binding into the future are backed by the force of law, the government probably
will replace these forward-looking conditions with a policy of rewarding existing sacri-
fices of constitutional liberty. For example, when imposing unconstitutional restric-
tions, the government could adopt a policy of repeatedly giving small or partial grants
and giving them only to recipients who already have complied with the government's
restrictions-thus avoiding the clear-cut effect of the force of law. In fact, at least
some experimentation with this sort of evasion has begun, as is evident from the legis-
lation underlying United States v. American Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003)-
legislation that barred any recovery of funds for non-compliance and instead author-
ized the government to deny future funds. 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(5)(A)-(B) (2000).
This tactical move, however, would simply shift the focus of analysis from the force
of law to mere force. Although the government would avoid the conclusion that it was
relying on the force of law, there would still remain the question of whether the gov-
ernment induced consent by means of constitutionally significant mere force. In con-
sidering this question, moreover, the government's policy of requiring the conditions
will be evidence that the conditions are regulatory. In the end, therefore, the govern-
ment can complicate the discernment of constitutionally significant force, but it can-
not avoid it.
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C. The Chain of Force in Delegated Restrictions
When the government asks states or private institutions to im-
pose unconstitutional restrictions, the question of federal force be-
comes more complicated. The problem is that even when the force
of federal law applies to such institutions, this does not necessarily
amount to force against the persons under their control. Of course,
one solution would be simply to recognize that the condition is
contrary to public policy and thus void.73 As it happens, though,
there is a more direct explanation-that the federal government's
conduct generates a chain of force, which reaches beyond the dele-
gated entity to the persons it restricts.
The Chain. -A chain of force attributable to the federal gov-
ernment is relatively common. It is evident whenever the govern-
ment uses conditions to delegate the imposition of unconstitutional
restrictions, and the states and institutions that serve as its agents
impose the restrictions in ways that are backed by the force of law.
To begin with a simple example, suppose a Southern state in the
1960s contracts with a park management company to operate a
state park, and suppose that the contract includes a condition that
the company is to carry out the state's admission requirements, in-
cluding the exclusion of blacks." The condition itself would not be
legally obligatory, and therefore, in a narrowly literal sense, the
company is legally free to admit or exclude blacks as it pleases.
Nonetheless, it will be seen that the state would be using force to
impose a discriminatory constraint in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The difficult question about the chain of force arises when one
asks about the application of the force to the restricted persons.
Although the government is relying on the collateral force of law
against the park management company, what force is used against
the blacks who seek entry? To be sure, one need not always reach
this question, for when the government uses a state or institution to
restrict individuals, the government often also restricts the state or
" For further details on this argument, see supra note 70 and infra note 77.
" Note that the state action in this case is much more direct than in Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (finding state action in the conduct of
a private restaurant, located in a state parking lot, that excluded black customers).
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institution itself, thus making any unconstitutional condition al-
ready unlawful as to that body. In general, however, in instances of
delegated restrictions, the government force must reach not only
the cooperating state or institution but also the persons that are
subject to these institutions.
An easy answer, perhaps too easy, could be found in a familiar
presumption. It has been seen that institutional consent is taken to
imply individual consent. Similarly, perhaps federal constraint of
an institution should be taken to imply federal constraint of the in-
dividuals controlled by the institution. Put another way, if the indi-
viduals are merged into their institution for purposes of consent,
why not also for constraint? Even were this logic persuasive, how-
ever, it would be of no avail in the park example, for the excluded
blacks are not employees or members of the park management
company.
A deeper answer involves a chain of constraint: first, the collat-
eral force of law against the cooperating states and institutions;
second, the force used by these entities against persons within their
jurisdiction or control. For instance, in the park example, the state
employs the force of law collaterally to enforce the unconstitu-
tional restrictions on the park management company, and the
company then uses such force against blacks. Although the com-
pany's coercion on behalf of the state ordinarily is mere force, it is
backed by the force of law. For instance, if the law justifies the
company in physically preventing blacks from entering the park, let
alone if the police or the courts back up the company in such ex-
clusion, then the company's conduct on behalf of the federal gov-
ernment collaterally has the force of law.
Similarly, when the federal government asks private universities
to carry out its unconstitutional licensing of speech and the press,
there is a chain of force: first, the government imposes conditions
backed by the force of law; second, on behalf of the government,
the universities and their IRBs impose the licensing on faculty and
students-initially by threatening them with barriers to further
verbal inquiry and publication, and ultimately by threatening to
fire the employees and expel the students, all of which is backed by
the force of law. In such ways, the government's coercion reaches
the censored individuals.
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Churches, charities, and educational organizations also illustrate
the point, for after the federal government imposes its conditions
on these § 501(c)(3) organizations, they impose the conditions on
their employees and members. It thus does not matter that the In-
ternal Revenue Service has rarely denied charitable status to a
church on account of its political speech. Such a measure is so se-
vere that the government need only warn a § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tion in order to obtain its compliance. The government's condi-
tions come with the force of law, and churches and other
§ 501(c)(3) organizations therefore tone down their ministers and
members. It may be only a church, not a government, that carries
out the restrictions on the minister and congregants, but the church
acts at the behest of the government, and when it takes punitive ac-
tion against its minister or members-for example, by silencing or
dismissing them-it is backed by the force of law. In such ways, the
force of law reaches down from the government to the bodies that
serve as its agents, and finally to their personnel.75
A Shelley v. Kraemer Problem? -The chain of force ultimately
comes to rest on contracts or other consensual arrangements be-
tween private parties, and it therefore is necessary to consider
whether such a chain runs into a Shelley v. Kraemer problem. Put
another way, how can there be state action in a private arrange-
ment?
Shelley held that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, state
courts could not enforce racially exclusionary covenants running
with the land.76 It is widely understood, however, that judicial en-
forcement of contracts, at least as to breaches of contracts between
private parties, does not ordinarily amount to state action. The
original Shelley problem thus was the difficulty of discerning why
the covenants in that case gave rise to unconstitutional state action
but other discriminatory private contracts did not. Fortunately, this
Shelley problem need not be solved here. Instead, the Shelley prob-
lem that matters here is more specific: why do consensual restric-
tions imposed by private institutions on their personnel have the
force of law, at least collaterally, when the institutions act at the
" For the meaning of the word "personnel" here, see supra note 20.
76 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
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request of the federal government, but not when the institutions
act independently of the federal government? As it turns out, there
is a clear answer-not necessarily to the original Shelley question,
but at least to the more specific Shelley issue here."
One of the things that may distinguish Shelley from other con-
tracts between private parties, and that certainly distinguishes the
instances here, is the role of the federal government in predeter-
mining the unconstitutional terms of the contracts. In Shelley, al-
though the government did not dictate the particular terms of the
land contracts, the common law doctrine on covenants running
with the land left little choice to the owners of the land that was
subject to racial covenants. If they were to sell their land, they had
to perpetuate the discrimination or face legal consequences. The
law itself thus predetermined the terms on which land could be
sold, and the law aligned its force behind such terms. When devel-
opers of subdivisions initially sold lots subject to racial covenants,
the law did not predetermine the terms. From that moment on-
ward, however, the owners of the lots were subject to the force of
the law if they breached the covenants.78 Thus, although the state
was not a party, and although the covenants themselves did not
have the force of law, the state participated in predetermining the
unlawful terms and collaterally gave them the force of law.
Of course, the law's role in shaping the unconstitutional terms of
the covenants in Shelley was sufficiently accidental that it is unclear
whether this alone can explain the case. Nonetheless, the govern-
ment's role in predetermining the content of the covenants after
the initial sale by the developers appears to be at least an element
of what distinguishes Shelley from other contracts cases. Although
contract law as applied to most private contracts does not give rise
" One explanation of Shelley has been largely ignored because the explanation does
not involve state action. In contracts between private parties, as already observed, su-
pra notes 8 and 70, a condition contrary to law, or even merely public policy, is void.
Thus, even if there were no state action in Shelley, the racially restrictive covenants
would have been void. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983) (holding that IRS can deny § 501(c)(3) tax status to racially discriminatory
educational organizations, as such discrimination is contrary to public policy and thus
not compatible with the charitable tax status).
" States also interjected themselves by establishing recording offices and by impos-
ing legal costs on parties who did not promptly record their deeds. In this way, not
only the common law but also state legislatures created impediments for black pur-
chasers.
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to state action, contract law plus racial covenants shaped by the
state gave the government a dual role, in which it not only pro-
vided the force of contract law but also contributed to the adoption
of the unconstitutional covenants.
This dual role is clearer here, and more clearly unconstitutional.
The government uses its conditions to set the terms of the ar-
rangements between the institutions and their personnel, and it
then backs up these terms with the force of law. For example, un-
der § 501(c)(3), employees (such as ministers, teachers, and charity
workers) and associated members of the public (such as congre-
gants, students, and charity volunteers) are subject to unconstitu-
tional conditions not merely on account of contract law and private
contracts. On the contrary, such persons are subject to unconstitu-
tional restrictions as a result of an unholy combination of contract
law and the conditions that the government imposes on key cul-
tural institutions. Thus, even more emphatically than in Shelley, the
question is not simply about the application of contract law to the
private choices made by private parties. Instead, the problem is
that contract law is being applied where the government has inter-
vened to ensure that private contracts will impose unconstitutional
restrictions.
Whereas the government's role in Shelley remains resistant to
simple analysis, the government's dual role in delegated unconsti-
tutional conditions is obvious. The government not only supplies
the force of contract law between private institutions and their per-
sonnel but also engages the private institutions as agents to impose
the government's unconstitutional restrictions. Far more than in
Shelley, therefore, the government both offers enforcement and
requires the unconstitutional terms.
The use of conditions to delegate unconstitutional restrictions
thus creates a chain of force, in which the force of law runs not
only from the government to other institutions, but also from the
institutions to their personnel. The bottom level of this chain ini-
tially may seem complicated because it often involves only private
institutions and their personnel. Once it is understood, however,
that the government both predetermines the unconstitutional
terms and backs them, collaterally, with the force of law, it be-
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comes apparent that the force of law reaches all the way from the
top of the chain to the bottom.7 9
In sum, notwithstanding that conditions come with consent, they
often also come with constitutionally significant government force.
The conditions that require immediate sacrifices of liberty fre-
quently are induced by force, which is most clearly evident when
the conditions are regulatory. Moreover, the conditions that bind
into the future are always backed by the force of law at the imple-
mentation stage. Consent thus does not preclude the existence of
force.
VI. PUBLIC INTEREST
Although by now it should be evident that consent cannot cure
unconstitutional restrictions-most concretely, not those that vio-
late the rights and structural limits-there may remain doubts on
the ground that constitutional rights belong to individuals. If such
rights really concern only those to whom they belong, such persons
should be able to alienate them in the same way as private rights.
There is, however, a public interest in personal rights. To be pre-
cise, the Constitution protects rights not merely for individuals, but
for the sake of the people as a whole. Personal consent therefore
cannot be taken to enlarge the power of the government in these
spheres of freedom. Indeed, the irrelevance of consent preserves
the interests of the people as a body in the liberty of individuals.
A. Individualistic and Functionalist Claims
From some individualistic and functionalist perspectives, rights
(or at least some of them) merely protect individual interests. The
shared assumption is that a constitutional right is alienable in the
same way as other personal property and that therefore an individ-
"9 The institutions understand that they are bringing federal law to bear on the indi-
viduals within their control, for they often warn their personnel that the federal re-
strictions must be obeyed because they are required by federal law. For example, the
University of Chicago answers the question, "Why is my research subject to review?"
by explaining that it has negotiated an assurance with the Federal Office for Human
Research Protections and that, "[i]n addition, federal laws require this protection."
University of Chicago, Social & Behavioral Sciences IRB & Investigator Manual 6
(2009), available at http://sbsirb.uchicago.edu/sites/sbsirb.uchicago.edu/files/
uploads/sbsirb manual.pdf.
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ual often can give up his rights-meaning not merely that he can
refrain from exercising them, but that he can convey power over
these little realms of freedom.
From a narrowly individualistic angle, a constitutional right is
the possession of individuals, who therefore can give it up. Espe-
cially when rights are considered in the version of libertarian
thought that values autonomy and alienability, it is difficult to re-
sist the conclusion that even constitutional rights are tradable ob-
jects.
This was not, however, the conception of rights adopted in
American constitutions. For one thing, the Constitution does not
secure most rights merely for individuals, but for all persons within
the protection of the law, including the groups and organizations
formed by individuals."0 In addition, as has been seen, the rights
protected by American constitutions were understood as limits on
government imposed by the people-indeed, as caveats to the
grant of powers-which means that, even though individuals can
decline to exercise their constitutional rights, they cannot, merely
through their individual consent, relieve the government of the
limits imposed by these rights.
From another, more functionalist perspective-taken by Frank
Easterbrook, Richard Epstein, and Thomas Merrill-it is assumed
that some but not all rights are merely of individual concern. The
underlying point is that government is limited not merely by the
Constitution's formal limits but also by a wide range of functional
limitations, including economic constraints. On this assumption, al-
though courts sometimes need to enforce constitutional rights, they
need not do so where an individual relinquishes his rights and
there are functional substitutes for them, which render them un-
necessary as legal limitations on government. In other words,
where there are functional substitutes for constitutional rights,
there is no public interest in protecting the rights themselves.
' The individualistic approach thus is mistaken on its face in assuming that constitu-
tional rights distinguish between individuals and other persons. Indeed, some of the
most individual of rights are valuable, both individually and politically, because they
can be exercised by private groups or institutions, through which individuals can exer-
cise a power unavailable to them merely as individuals. It thus is no accident that, for
example, the freedom of speech and the freedom of religion belong not only to indi-
viduals but also to groups or institutions, whether secular or religious.
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For example, where the government acts in the private sphere
and thus has private rivals, it is possible that the market will func-
tion as an adequate substitute for constitutional rights. Similarly,
where the government does not exert monopoly power, and thus
leaves individuals free to make arrangements with other actors,
perhaps the government does not need to be constrained by due
process and other constitutional rights. The functional alternatives
to these constitutional limits appear to drain them of their public
significance, and therefore, if individuals consent, the government
should not be constrained by the limits.81
These individualist and functionalist arguments, however, run
into difficulties. Most centrally, they are mistaken in their assump-
tion that constitutional rights are sometimes of merely personal in-
terest."
B. The Public Interest in Personal Liberty
Personal rights are matters in which there is a profound public
interest. Indeed, they are matters in which the people have de-
clared their interest. They therefore cannot be left to private indi-
viduals or institutions.
" Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges,
and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 309, 349; see also Epstein,
Bargaining, supra note 2, at 174. For another, somewhat functionalist approach,
which assumes that there is an overriding public interest in some constitutional rights,
see Merrill, Dolan, supra note 2, at 869-71. Interestingly, the functionalist arguments
are more common in conversation than in the literature.
Accompanying this functionalist analysis of limits on government is a similarly func-
tionalist approach to understanding whether the government has acted with coercive
force. From this perspective, if the government offers benefits for which there are
adequate substitutes in the market, it evidently has not acted coercively. In contrast, if
it offers benefits for which there are no private substitutes, there is more likely to be
coercion.
' Of course, there are other problems. For example, both arguments invite judges
to pick and choose which rights they should enforce-on the basis of a judge's almost
metaphysical understanding of individual freedom at one extreme, or of a judge's
economic conception of functional substitutes for law at the other extreme. Those
who argue for either individualistic or functionalist departures from the formal re-
quirements of law surely have the burden of showing that judges have both the au-
thority and the competence to make such open-ended decisions. At least thus far,
however, the arguments for such departures have not evolved to the point of showing
that judges have adequate authority and competence.
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This sort of observation already is familiar from the literature on
property rights and how they differ from contract rights. Property
rights seem quintessentially individualistic. But the law on property
rights sharply limits what individuals can contract for, and, as
shown by Professors Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, this formal
limitation on private consent protects the interests of the public."
Similarly, by limiting the effect of private consent, constitutional
law protects the public interest in constitutional liberty.
The very nature of constitutional law is to place constitutional
limits beyond any political bargain, including any bargain between
Congress and individuals. Constitutional law comes from the peo-
ple, who thereby reserve to themselves the matters that they de-
cide cannot safely be left to legislative political deals. By making a
constitution in which they reserve such issues to themselves, the
people declare their predominant interest in such matters, and they
do this in their constitution because this is the law in which they,
not Congress, are the lawmakers. It therefore makes no difference
whether Congress thinks it has an interest in such questions, or
whether it gets the consent of states or private parties, for the
whole point of constitutional law is to preserve the public's inter-
ests by establishing limits outside the reach of legislative interests
and deals.
More generally, the people have an interest in maintaining their
constitution as a law under which the government is accountable. If
the government can make a side deal to purchase its way out from
under constitutional limitations, the Constitution cannot consis-
tently limit government in its relation to the people, and the people
cannot consistently rely on the law and the courts to hold the gov-
ernment accountable to them. In other words, if the government
can use the consent of an individual to acquire greater power over
her speech and religion than the government enjoys under the
Constitution, then the society as a whole will lose not only the pub-
lic advantages of her verbal and religious freedom but also, even
more seriously, the advantages of having rights as limits on gov-
ernment power.
'Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 7-8 (2000).
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Quite apart from these structural considerations, the people
have an interest in the equal liberty of all persons in relation to
government. As already hinted, when government can buy its way
out of the constitutional rights of some classes of institutions or in-
dividuals, it leaves them with lesser rights than other persons. It is
apt to have greatest success in purchasing constitutional rights,
moreover, when dealing with institutions and individuals who have
become dependent on government or who otherwise are sensitive
to financial pressures. Unconstitutional conditions thus tend to
magnify the inequality of the financially sensitive-giving the law
the effect of reinforcing vulnerability.
Put another way, if one views the Constitution as a sort of rela-
tional contract, which is renegotiated over time, there is a danger
that the poor not only will remain poor but also will lose their
freedom. Relational contracts can have much value among rela-
tively equal or independent parties, but among unequal parties
who are bound together, they soon can exaggerate existing ine-
qualities. This matters here because the government usually has
greater power than any individual or class of individuals. In these
circumstances, the assumption that constitutional rights are subject
to continual renegotiation between the government and individuals
does not bode well for the latter, especially if they are poor or oth-
erwise financially vulnerable. At least when the Constitution is
viewed as a relational contract between the government and the
people, there is the possibility of some parity between the parties
(although even among these parties, the people need formal consti-
tutional protections precisely to avoid having their rights whittled
away). In contrast, if the Constitution is understood as a relational
contract between government and individuals, the disparity of
power allows the government repeatedly to renegotiate the rela-
tionship, always increasing its power, and diminishing individual
liberty, particularly for those who are dependent on the govern-
ment. The vision of the Constitution as a relational contract thus
will tend to reduce the poor to a sort of servitude, in which the
poor and others who are financially vulnerable not only remain
economically dependent but also become legally subordinated-
reduced to a caste that is deprived of the equal protection of the
law.
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Of course, the financially vulnerable include not only the poor
but also institutions and their personnel who press against the
boundaries of political power in new or unpopular ways, such as
universities and their academics and students, or churches and
their clergy and members.' Although some such institutions are
very wealthy, and tend to be very strong in their own little ponds,
they are utterly vulnerable in the larger world, especially as most
operate at the margins of financial sustainability. For example,
even though a biochemistry laboratory relies on extensive funding,
the struggle of scientists to explore new and often politically chal-
lenging knowledge almost always leaves them anxious for further
money and vulnerable to any loss of funding. And the vulnerability
of these institutions is felt even more acutely by the individuals
who work within them. As a result, large classes of Americans, in-
cluding academics, clergy, and other institutionally dependent in-
tellectuals, are subject to almost irresistible pressures to acquiesce
in sacrifices of their constitutional rights.85
The questions of inequality and vulnerable classes bring the
question back to the structural concerns, for if the government can
make a separate peace with part of the society, it can diminish the
power of people to defend their liberty. Consider, for example, the
free-speech rights of an individual. If she is willing to trade her
speech and religion rights for cash, why shouldn't she? These rights
are hers, and she is free to refrain from exercising them. But as
other scholars have observed, the public also has an interest in her
rights.6 This public interest in her rights is often understood as an
interest in her knowledge and opinion, which contributes to the
knowledge and opinions of the rest of the society. 7 More basically,
' For lack of a better term, the word "personnel" is used here to mean not merely
employees, but all persons associated with an institution-not only teachers but also
students, not only clergy but also congregants, etc.
85 This vulnerability also is felt by states, especially those following policies that de-
viate from national trends. Not entirely unlike intellectuals in academic institutions,
states experiment with ideas and policies, being in effect laboratories of change. Like
universities, moreover, states often strain their resources, and they and especially
their nonconformist experiments therefore are vulnerable to demands that they give
up their constitutional freedom in exchange for federal funds.
8 Merrill, Dolan, supra note 2, at 870 (citing Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech without
Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 558-60
(1991)).
' Farber, supra note 86, at 558-59; Merrill, Dolan, supra note 2, at 870.
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even if she is not apt to say or believe much, the society as a whole
has a stake in her continuing to enjoy a freedom of speech and re-
ligion, for rights enjoy the greatest security when they are shared
by the broadest number of persons. Rights that are the property of
all can have the psychological and political commitment of all, thus
giving even the most personal rights an essential societal resilience.
In contrast, unconstitutional conditions chip away at the shared in-
terest of Americans in their rights, leaving an ever-smaller number
willing to stand up for their constitutional freedoms.
Thus, in many ways, there is a public interest in preserving the
rights of all persons as legal limits on government. More will be
said in the Conclusion about the interests of the entire society in
barring the government from using consent to evade rights and
create inequalities. Already here, however, it should be evident
that the nation as a whole has an interest in consistently and
equally protecting the constitutional liberty of all Americans, re-
gardless of their consent.
VII. IMPLICATIONS
The final task of this Article is to examine the practical implica-
tions of the observation here that consent cannot relieve the gov-
ernment of the constitutional limits on its power. The implications
will be examined as to three types of conditions: those concerning
speech, property, and procedure.
These sorts of conditions tend to pose problems for the current
approach to unconstitutional conditions. In asking whether a con-
dition is really just a purchase, the current analysis has left courts
adrift, unable to explain their different treatment of different con-
ditions, notably those on speech, property, and procedure. As a re-
sult, leading commentators complain that the consent analysis can-
not be applied consistently.8
In contrast, the range of conditions reveals the robustness of this
Article's theory. On the assumption that consent cannot enlarge
the government's constitutional authority, this Article sorts out
speech, property, and procedure conditions simply by asking about
the lawfulness of the restrictions. To be precise, it follows what by
now should be a familiar double-barreled inquiry. The initial gen-
See supra note 10 and infra note 112.
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eral question is whether a restriction violates the Constitution-in
particular, whether it violates either the limited powers or the
rights and structures that limit these powers. Of course, where the
restriction violates a constitutional right, force is an element of the
violation, and it therefore is necessary to follow up with a second,
more specific inquiry as to whether there is constitutionally signifi-
cant government force. In this manner, it becomes possible to pro-
vide a textured and consistent explanation of divergent conditions.
A. Speech Conditions
The implications for speech conditions have already been sug-
gested in Part I, where it was seen how the government uses such
conditions in ways that evade the First Amendment. All govern-
ments occasionally are tempted to abridge the freedom of speech,
and the government of the United States has used conditions to re-
strict the political speech of clergy, the inquiry and publications of
academics, and the use of the airwaves. These and the govern-
ment's other unconstitutional speech restrictions cannot be saved
by consent or delegation, and where they are imposed with consti-
tutionally significant force-indeed, usually the force of law-they
are unlawful.
Tax Restrictions on Churches, Charities, and Educational Institu-
tions. -It will be recalled that the government's § 501(c)(3) restric-
tions on the First Amendment rights of churches, charities, and
educational institutions are justified as conditions on a benefit.
These organizations, it is said, get the benefit of tax-free income
and of contributions that are deductible to the donors. In ex-
change, the organizations give up their freedom to engage in cer-
tain types of political speech and petitioning-in particular, they,
their employees, and their members give up much of their freedom
to campaign for political candidates and to lobby government.
Even if the favorable tax treatment really is a government benefit,
are the concomitant speech conditions constitutional?9
'9 As discussed in supra note 18, there is an important underlying question as to
whether the favorable tax treatment is really a government benefit or just an unequal
constraint. If the latter, it is a dramatic penalty on political speech, without regard to
any question of unconstitutional conditions.
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To conclude that the consent of the tax-exempt institutions cures
the unconstitutionality would be to assume that the consent of
some churches, charities, and educational institutions can relieve
the federal government of the limits imposed on it by the people.
This is not plausible, and the government therefore remains subject
to the limitations of the First Amendment, regardless of the con-
sent.
The remaining questions are those of delegation and force. Al-
though the federal government delegates much of the censorship
to the § 501(c)(3) organizations, the government cannot avoid the
unconstitutionality of its restrictions on speech and petitioning by
asking these institutions to impose the restrictions on its behalf.
The restrictions in the conditions, moreover, are backed by the
force of law-at the very least because breaching § 501(c)(3) or-
ganizations are subject to government demands for back taxes
(within the statute of limitations).' In short, the speech restrictions
are grossly unconstitutional, and the conditions and delegation
cannot avoid the constitutional violation.
None of this is to say that the federal government must subsidize
the electoral and lobbying speech of churches, charities, or educa-
tional institutions.' But just because the government supports or-
ganizations does not mean it can exceed its constitutional power.
IRB Licensing of Human-Subjects Research. -To impose licens-
ing of speech and the press on human-subjects research, the gov-
ernment makes the licensing a condition of its research grants. As
has been seen, universities and research institutions always comply,
thus requiring their faculty, students, and other personnel to get
IRB permission before beginning inquiry designed to produce
"generalizable" or publishable knowledge. The result is IRB li-
'0 Although the IRS apparently has almost never gone to such lengths, this does not
undermine the argument here, which is based on the government's legal power. In-
deed, the hesitation of the IRS to exercise its power suggests that it is at least vaguely
aware that it is standing on thin constitutional ice.
" The question of how the government can encourage such organizations without
subsidizing their campaigning and lobbying is complicated, and the answer may be
particularly difficult as to religious organizations. Suffice it to say, however, that it is a
different question from whether the speech restrictions on such groups are constitu-
tional.
2012]
546 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 98:479
censing of what individuals can say and learn in their inquiries and
of what they can publish about the results.
Once again, however, consent and delegation cannot cure the
violation of the First Amendment.' As a result, the licensing re-
quirements imposed through the conditions must be evaluated on
their merits as restrictions on liberty. As it happens, they bind the
research institutions into the future and thus are backed by the
force of law. Indeed, they are severely enforceable through cross-
collateralized conditions. They therefore violate the First Amend-
ment.93
It may be feared that this means the federal government cannot
regulate harm done in research. The conclusion, however, is much
narrower. Although the government can address research harms, it
cannot do so by licensing speech or the press, as this is flagrantly
unconstitutional.94
9 The Constitution's bar against delegation of unconstitutional restrictions is par-
ticularly clear as to the licensing of speech and the press. The seventeenth-century
English licensing system was the model of what the First Amendment's press clause
rejected, and already in that English system, the licensing of the press as to academics
and students was delegated to the universities. Hamburger, Getting Permission, supra
note 2, at 448-49. It thus becomes evident that delegated licensing was part of what
the First Amendment prohibited.
"Along similar lines, when the federal government required researchers to get fed-
eral permission before sharing their results, a federal district court held this condition
unconstitutional. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472,
473, 478-79 (D.D.C. 1991). The National Institutes of Health had awarded a grant to
researchers at Stanford University on the condition that they "obtain government ap-
proval before publishing or otherwise publicly discussing preliminary research re-
sults." Id. at 473. When the university challenged this condition, the court held the
condition unconstitutional under the First Amendment, explaining that otherwise
"the result would be an invitation to government censorship wherever public funds
flow, and ... thus.., an enormous threat to the First Amendment rights of American
citizens and to a free society." Id. at 478.
9'A private university could still impose the licensing on its own initiative, but if it
did so in response to conditions, or even merely in response to a government policy of
awarding more grants to compliant institutions, the government would still be in vio-
lation of the First Amendment. See supra Parts IV and V, including note 72.
It is important to observe that there is no scientifically serious empirical evidence of
the alleged harms. To be precise, there is no such evidence that, overall, human-
subjects research is particularly dangerous. Of course, some research projects do
cause injuries. Yet there is no scientifically serious evidence that, overall, anything is
more harmful when done in research or even human-subjects research than when
done in other circumstances.
There were a series of notorious studies done in the mid-twentieth century, the
most famous being the Tuskegee syphilis study, the Willowbrook hepatitis research,
Unconstitutional Conditions
Licensing of Airwaves. -The licensing of what is said on the air-
waves is similarly explained as a condition on a government bene-
fit. But even if the airwaves are a benefit received from govern-
ment, can the government make unconstitutional restrictions on
speech the condition of a broadcasting license?95 Again, consent
and delegation are no cure, and because the conditions run into the
future, they are backed by the force of law. Accordingly, the gov-
ernment cannot use these conditions to impose restrictions that
violate the First Amendment. To conclude otherwise is to conclude
that the consent of a broadcasting company can give the govern-
ment a power that the people prohibited it from exercising.
Of course, the FCC can still license the use of the airwaves. And
at least the state governments can still prosecute radio stations for
unlawful speech-to the extent such prosecutions are constitution-
ally permitted. But the FCC cannot license access to the airwaves
on the basis of what is said on the airwaves, for this is licensing of
speech.96
and the Army radiation experiments. These governmental studies, however, are not
evidence of the harm from human-subjects research in general. On the contrary, they
show the harmfulness of government medical research on wards of government or on
persons dependent on government. In fact, the standard article that is cited to show
harm from human-subjects research is actually based on data that consist largely of
experiments on wards of government done by government doctors or government-
funded doctors. The article's author, Henry Beecher, suppressed information that
would have shown the dangerous role of government, and his study therefore has
been accepted as proof of the danger of all human-subjects research. When the un-
derlying evidence is examined, however, it shows that the danger was primarily from
research on wards of government by government doctors or government-funded doc-
tors. Hamburger, Getting Permission, supra note 2, at 455-56 (showing suppression of
data in Beecher's 1966 study and revealing implications of the suppressed data).
There also have been some deaths in recent medical experiments, and these fatali-
ties regularly are relied upon to justify the regulation of human-subjects research.
These deaths, however, have occurred almost entirely in the new drug and device tri-
als conducted under FDA regulations, and they therefore are not evidence about the
danger of research conducted under the human-subjects research regulations. Fatali-
ties under one regulatory regime, concerning a particularly dangerous sort of re-
search, cannot justify the imposition of licensing on other research under another
regulatory regime.
5 In fact, the licensing of the airwaves is really an allocation of scarce commonly
held space rather than an allocation of government property. See supra note 42.
" Contra FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009) (upholding the
FCC's liability order for fleeting expletives on television); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding the FCC's order for systematic repetition of offensive, in-
decent words).
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Consent Decrees Limiting Speech. -Other speech conditions
that are at risk under the analysis presented here are those appear-
ing in consent decrees. Whether in the settlement of the govern-
ment's legal claims, or in the settlement of entirely private dis-
putes, consent decrees sometimes include provisions limiting what
private parties can say afterward.'
All consent decrees that silence private parties beyond what is
required by their legal duties must be considered problematic even
before one gets to the question of conditions on speech. The duty
and, indeed, the very office of a judge traditionally were to exercise
judgment in accord with the law of the land.98 Accordingly, it long
was understood that a judge could not enter a consent decree
where he knew it did not follow the law." In other words, regard-
less of the private contracts a judge could enforce, he could not en-
ter a decree, even with the parties' consent, where he knowingly
was imposing a restriction not required by law-let alone, an
unlawful restriction.
The problem that more centrally matters in this Article, how-
ever, is not the lawfulness of the judge's action, but rather the law-
fulness of the conditions sought by the federal government where it
is a party to the consent decree. Conditions in consent decrees
clearly are backed by the force of law, and therefore if the gov-
ernment obtains an unconstitutional restriction on speech in a con-
sent decree, the decree is unlawful-regardless of whether it car-
9'For a defense of many but not all such decrees within an analysis of unconstitu-
tional conditions, see Merrill, The Constitution and the Cathedral, supra note 2, at
1197-99 (justifying bargained restrictions on commercial speech, but not political
speech).
Hamburger, supra note 53, at 103-47.
As explained in an English case:
The court will not give a Judgment which they know would be against the Law,
altho' the Plaintiff and Defendant do agree to have such a Judgment
given.... For the Judges are to do equal Justice according to their best Skill,
and not to err wilfully, and against their Knowledge, to please the Parties.
2 John Lilly, The Practical Register 136-37 (London, E. Nutt et al. 1735) (citing a
King's Bench case of 1671).
The general point about judicial duty calls into doubt all consent decrees in which
judges depart from what is required by law. Although the departure from judicial
duty is sufficient reason to hold such decrees void, this conclusion also is supported by
a range of other considerations, including the risk of inequality; the risk of using
courts to give effect to extortionate conduct, limited judicial competence, and the
separation of powers.
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ries into the future or involves merely an immediate sacrifice of
liberty. Although it may be thought that such a consent decree
could be saved by the judicial role in entering it as an order, this
judicial participation actually clarifies the constitutional difficulty,
for it leaves no doubt that the unconstitutional restriction has the
force of law.
Government Contractors. -Further speech conditions are those
on government contractors. For example, the government has used
its funding to place conditions on the speech of artists and family
planning organizations."°
Such cases usually are said to involve purchases of speech-as if
the consent of private persons could enlarge government power
beyond the First Amendment's limitations. Certainly Congress,
under its powers, has the authority to use conditions to define what
it is purchasing. But if Congress imposes restrictions on contractors
that violate the First Amendment, and if the restrictions are bind-
ing into the future or otherwise come with constitutionally signifi-
cant government force, it is not evident how the contractors' con-
sent can relieve the government of its constitutional limits.
Although the contractors can consensually decline to exercise their
First Amendment rights, they cannot thereby give the government
any power to impose restrictions that violate the Amendment.
Such restrictions on government contractors therefore cannot be
explained in terms of purchases or other types of consent.
A partial explanation, however, can be found in the Supreme
Court's inquiry as to whether conditions are germane and propor-
tionate. Although the Court examines these considerations on the
assumption that consent can cure an unconstitutional restriction,
their real significance lies elsewhere. As already noted, where a re-
1 In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, the Supreme Court rejected a facial
challenge to a statutory requirement that, when the NEA establishes procedures for
awarding grants, it must "tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency and
respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public." 524 U.S. 569, 572-
73 (1998). Although not itself a conditions case, it is suggestive of the sort of condi-
tions that have at various times been placed on funding of the arts. In Rust v. Sullivan,
the Court rejected a challenge by doctors to a condition imposed by groups receiving
federal funding for family-planning services-a condition that required the groups not
to counsel or otherwise encourage abortion as a method of family planning. 500 U.S.
173, 177-78 (1991).
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striction does not bind into the future, and where it is germane and
proportionate, it is not regulatory and therefore usually does not
amount to constitutionally significant force. Such a restriction on a
contractor therefore does not violate a contractor's freedom of
speech and the press.
Another explanation also rests on the inquiry as to whether a re-
striction is germane and proportionate-not as a measure of gov-
ernment force, but more broadly as a measure of whether the re-
striction abridges the freedom of speech. Not every restriction on
speech is an abridgement of the freedom of speech, and the differ-
ence between a restriction on speech and an abridgment of the
freedom of speech often depends on context-in particular, on the
relevance and proportionality of the restriction to the danger it ad-
dresses. Although the Supreme Court usually discusses such prob-
lems in terms of compelling government interests, overbreadth,
and narrow tailoring, the larger point is that speech restrictions
need to be relevant and proportional to more or less tangible dan-
gers, lest the government abridge the freedom of speech. Accord-
ingly, when the Supreme Court analyzes unconstitutional condi-
tions in terms of germaneness and proportionality, it sometimes is
really examining the constitutionality of the speech restriction
rather than, as claimed, whether consent can justify an unconstitu-
tional restriction. By now it should be clear that consent cannot do
this, but the germaneness and proportionality of a speech restric-
tion can help to sort out whether it is constitutional.
Consider, for example, a statute directly' barring persons from
publishing materials containing racial slurs or other insensitive lan-
guage. If the statute (directly or by condition) restricts all persons,
it clearly is neither germane nor proportionate-or, put another
way, it clearly is overbroad and unsupported by a compelling gov-
ernment interest-and it therefore abridges the freedom of speech
and the press. If the statute applies (either directly or by condition)
to all persons receiving any government benefits, including merely
health benefits, it similarly abridges this freedom. But what if the
statute applies only to persons who receive government funding for
charter schools, and only to what they say in these schools? Or
what if it applies only to advertisers hired by the government to
present its sex-education message, and only in their presentations
on behalf of the government? Such restrictions are germane and
550 [Vol. 98:479
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proportionate, which is to say that, regardless of whether imposed
directly or by condition, they are based on compelling government
interests, are narrowly tailored, and are not overbroad.
It thus becomes apparent that many government restrictions on
its contractors are of a sort that the government could impose di-
rectly, and it therefore also can impose them by condition. Con-
sider, for example, a government limit on what census workers or
sex-education workers can say in the scope of their duties. Where
the government hires them as federal employees, it clearly can pass
a statute directly limiting what they say while working with mem-
bers of the public-for example, barring them from discussing their
personal views, requiring them to be courteous, and requiring them
to give advice that strictly follows government policy. The next
step is to consider what the government can do when it hires them
as contractors. Presumably, it can adopt a statute imposing similar
direct limits on them without violating the First Amendment, even
though they are contractors rather than employees. This is reveal-
ing because, to the extent the First Amendment allows the gov-
ernment directly to restrict the speech of contractors, it also allows
the government to restrict them by condition. Either way, such re-
strictions do not abridge the freedom of speech and the press.
Notwithstanding this conclusion about the lawfulness of many
restrictions on contractors, it must be qualified by another point,
about the employees of government contractors. Where the con-
tractor's employees are simply agents of the contractor, and where
the government's restriction on the speech of the contractor is law-
ful, it would appear that an extension of the restriction to the con-
tractor's employees is also lawful. In some instances, however, em-
ployees are agents for some purposes but independent actors for
other purposes. For example, professors employed by educational
institutions are agents in the sense that they have to teach and pub-
lish their research, but they ordinarily are independent actors in
presenting their scholarly views in their courses and in pursuing
their own topics, ideas, and attitudes in their research. In such
ways, their teaching and research is theirs rather than their em-
ployer's, and to this extent they ordinarily enjoy a presumption of
freedom. Thus, even when the First Amendment allows the gov-
ernment to restrict the speech of a contractor, this does not always
mean that the government thereby can restrict the speech of the
2012]
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contractor's employees. At least in some instances, the restriction
on the employees will be overbroad, not narrowly tailored, and un-
supported by a compelling government interest.
The government's restriction on the doctors in Rust v. Sullivan
therefore raises a different question than its restrictions on gov-
ernment-funded artists. 1' Whereas the artists are government con-
tractors, the doctors in Rust were employees of government con-
tractors, and the central question in Rust therefore was not simply
whether the government could constitutionally impose its restric-
tion on the contractors, but whether it could thereby impose the
restriction on the doctors. At least to some degree, they were inde-
pendent actors who enjoyed a freedom to decide for themselves
what constituted good medical advice. Indeed, they were subject to
state law in giving advice-a sort of law that could be trumped by
federal law, but not a mere federal contract. The Supreme Court,
however, evidently concluded that the doctors were close enough
to being mere agents that the restriction on their speech was con-
stitutional. At the same time, the Court acknowledged that the
problem would be more severe in academia, saying that "the uni-
versity is a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to
the functioning of our society that the Government's ability to con-
trol speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to
the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the vague-
ness and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment."'
1
In short, a restriction that satisfies the First Amendment can be
imposed directly or by condition, and the speech restrictions that
meet the Supreme Court's "germane" and "proportional" test are
apt to satisfy some key First Amendment doctrines. What is consti-
tutional as applied to government contractors, however, is not al-
ways constitutional as applied to their employees, and this is par-
ticularly clear as to faculty and students in academic institutions. 3
Government Employees. -Another set of speech cases occurs
when governments fire their employees for speaking out on con-
troversial questions, whether matters of policy, politics, or religion.
... Rust, 500 U.S. 169.
02 Id. at 200.
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These cases tend to involve state restrictions barring state teachers,
police officers, transit workers, or other employees from expressing
their political or religious views on their own time.
Such cases often are explained in terms of consent-as if they
were merely purchases of speech-but if private consent cannot
enlarge government power, another explanation is necessary. In
fact, these cases can be better understood in terms of whether the
restrictions on speech abridge the freedom of speech and the press.
Largely through the influence of Law and Economics, all ar-
rangements nowadays, including the duties imposed by govern-
ment on its employees, tend to be viewed as contractual. At the
outset, however, it should be recognized that most public employ-
ees traditionally were not understood to have contractual ar-
rangements with government. Instead, it was said that they were
public officers and that the law, in recognition of their status, im-
posed duties on them and provided compensation." Although this
traditional conception of public office is not necessary for the ar-
gument here about the irrelevance of consent, it is a useful re-
minder that there is nothing inherent or predetermined about the
contractual analysis. Even in government employee cases, in which
such analysis may seem especially apt, it may be equally reasonable
to focus on another approach-on the lawfulness of the restrictions
imposed on persons on the basis of their traits or status, including
their status as public employees.
The poverty of consent as an explanation of conditions on gov-
ernment employees can be observed from the famous statement of
Justice Holmes: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a police-
man.""°5 This bon mot is at least overstated, for there clearly are
many conditions that a municipality cannot impose on policemen.
In fact, as might be expected under traditional law, the municipal
regulation in the case was a direct restriction, and it provided
merely that "[n]o member of the department shall be allowed to
solicit money.., for any political purpose whatever."1" This re-
" See Frank J. Goodnow, Selected Cases on the Law of Officers including Extraor-
dinary Legal Remedies 304 (1906); Bruce Wyman, The Principles of the Administra-
tive Law Governing the Relations of Public Officers 159-66 (1903).
"' McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
10 Id.
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striction carried out an essential government interest, and it did not
obviously go beyond a narrowly tailored response. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has distinguished between political speech and mere
gifts to political campaigns, and along such lines, it is not unrea-
sonable to conclude that a bar on police solicitations does not
abridge the freedom of speech. The case therefore does not show
that consent justifies otherwise unconstitutional restrictions on
government employees; on the contrary, it merely suggests that a
bar on police solicitation does not abridge the freedom of speech.
Thus, once again, the talk about purchasing is a distraction.
What really matters is whether a restriction on speech goes so far
as to abridge the freedom of speech.
Along these lines, when the Court analyzes speech conditions by
asking whether they are germane and proportionate, it often is
merely tracking its conventional analysis of direct restrictions on
speech. The Court allows the government to pass a law directly
limiting the speech of its employees where the restriction is sup-
ported by a compelling government interest and is narrowly tai-
lored to this interest; and the Court similarly allows speech condi-
tions where they are germane and proportionate. In these
conditions cases, although the Court speaks of germane and pro-
portionate conditions, it does not really depart from its standard
analysis of direct speech restrictions in terms of government inter-
ests and narrow tailoring. Thus, regardless of whether the govern-
ment acts directly or through conditions, it can bar teachers from
discussing irrelevant matters in class. But it clearly cannot bar them
from discussing politics on their own time, because this would not
be germane or proportionate-because, in other words, this would
not be supported by a compelling government interest and would
not be narrowly tailored to the interest.
Of course, where the prohibition appears in a condition, there
remains the question of whether it comes with constitutionally sig-
nificant force. When the government imposes an overreaching
speech condition that runs into the future-such as a requirement
that teachers not discuss school-board elections on their own
time-the abridgement of the freedom comes with the force of
[Vol. 98:479
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law."°7 Otherwise, the question of force is apt to rest on whether the
condition is regulatory, which again is a contextual inquiry resting
on germaneness and proportionality. If regulatory, the condition
has the relevant degree of force and therefore is unconstitutional.
Snepp. -A good example of a government employee case is
Snepp v. United States."° Snepp was a former CIA agent who pub-
lished a book about his work with the government. He thereby vio-
lated a condition of his contract requiring him to get prior permis-
sion before publishing any such material, and the government
therefore sued Snepp to recover his profits on his book. The Su-
preme Court upheld the verdict against him, and this has seemed
puzzling. The explanation, however, is simple: the restriction on
speech was constitutional and could have been imposed directly by
law.
As already observed, many direct restrictions on speech are not
abridgments of the freedom of speech, and this includes restric-
tions on a fiduciary's disclosure of confidential information. As it
happens, it is not conventional to explain government restrictions
on information in terms of fiduciary duties. Such a theory, how-
ever, clearly underlies some of the relevant federal statutes, and it
offers a very realistic and textured account of when the govern-
ment can require information to be kept confidential.
The classification of information serves to give notice of what in-
formation the government considers confidential. As a result,
when anyone, while serving in a fiduciary capacity, as was true of
Snepp, acquires access to what evidently is classified information,
he assumes fiduciary duties to avoid disclosing such information.
Moreover, where the law recognizes these duties, he can be subject
to legal penalties for disclosure."° Accordingly, when such a person
'0' See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 595, 603 (1972) (holding that a college
had to offer a hearing to an untenured professor fired for his opinions about the fu-
ture of the college); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 566, 568 (1968) (holding
that a school board could not fire a high school teacher for writing a letter critical of
the board).
,' 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
.. For example, the federal statute on "[g]athering, transmitting or losing defense
information" provides:
Whoever, being entrusted with or having lawful possession or control of any
document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic
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wishes to publish confidential information without being subject to
legal sanctions, he needs to make a First Amendment argument
that overrides his fiduciary duty, or he needs to get the govern-
ment's authorization to publish. Snepp did neither.
Because the law can enforce the fiduciary duties of CIA officers
without violating the First Amendment, the government can penal-
ize breaches of such duties either by condition or directly by law.
Thus, although the government sought to recover Snepp's profits
on his book as a matter of contract, it also could have taken more
severe measures against him under its statutes that directly bar the
disclosure of confidential information by fiduciaries. This non-
contractual option is particularly important because, although
Snepp and other CIA officers typically become fiduciaries volun-
tarily by contract, drafted military officers become fiduciaries in-
voluntarily by law.
Consent thus is utterly unnecessary to explain Snepp or the
other cases involving speech conditions. Indeed, discussion of con-
sent merely confuses the analysis and mistakenly suggests that the
government can impose restrictions that the Constitution clearly
forbids.
negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, note, or informa-
tion, relating to the national defense, (1) through gross negligence permits the
same to be removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in
violation of his trust, or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, or (2) having
knowledge that the same has been illegally removed from its proper place of
custody or delivered to anyone in violation of its trust, or lost, or stolen, ab-
stracted, or destroyed, and fails to make prompt report of such loss, theft, ab-
straction, or destruction to his superior officer-
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 793(f) (2006).
Even when focusing on executive officers, federal law draws on the concept of fidu-
ciary duties. For example, the law restricts executive officers as to the information
they acquire in the course of their duties:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States ... publishes, di-
vulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any extent not author-
ized by law any information coming to him in the course of his employment or
official duties.., shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both; and shall be removed from office or employment.
18 U.S.C. §1905 (2006).
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B. Property Conditions
The best-known property conditions are those restricting land.
In such cases, the question is whether the restrictions amount to
unconstitutional takings of property.
A pair of cases has defined most discussion of the question. In
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Commission permit-
ted the Nollans to replace a bungalow on their beachfront lot with
a larger house, but only on the condition that they allow a public
easement across their beach, thus connecting two public beaches
that lay on either side of theirs." ' In Dolan v. City of Tigard, the
city approved Dolan's application to expand her store and pave
her parking lot, but on the condition that she dedicate portions of
her land for a public greenway and a pedestrian/bicycle path."'
Notwithstanding the hand-wringing over these cases, they need
not be complex. Indeed, they are simpler than most cases discussed
in this Article, for in both instances the landowners refused to con-
sent and instead appealed the decisions of their local governments.
The cases thus arose not as unconstitutional conditions, but simply
as government demands for acquiescence in unconstitutional con-
ditions.
In each case, the local government sought to take property for
public use under threat of a denial of zoning. The question of force
therefore rested on the decision of a government body backed by
the force of law. For example, if Dolan or the Nollans had pro-
ceeded to build without allowing, respectively, the dedication or
easement, they would have been subject to legal action. The gov-
ernments in each case therefore clearly acted with the force of law,
and the only remaining question was whether the demanded use of
the property was Of the sort or degree that constitutes a taking.
The question of whether the use in each case constituted a tak-
ing may be considered complex, but it was no different from if the
local government had simply seized the property for the demanded
use. If the local government had directly imposed its easement on
Dolan or the Nollans, even if it had done this as authorized by zon-
ing regulations, there would be little doubt that it would be physi-
cally seizing part of a particular property and that this would con-
"o 483 U.S. 825,827-28 (1987).
,.,512 U.S. 374,379 (1994).
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stitute a taking. Accordingly, the takings questions should not have
been distinctively difficult.
If Dolan or the Nollans had consented and then protested, the
cases would be closer to the others considered here, but with no
difference in outcome, for after consent, the conditions would have
bound the landowners into the future, thus imposing legally en-
forceable duties on them not to bar the public from their property.
The takings thus would have had just as much force of law as in the
actual cases. With or without consent, these were takings.
In short, if the government lacks the power to take property,
private consent is irrelevant. This conclusion already has been
noted in an eighteenth-century takings decision-the Symsbury
Case, discussed in Appendix A. The court there evidently held that
consent could not cure the taking because the taking was beyond
the government's constitutional power. The same logic applies in
the contemporary cases.
C. Procedural Conditions
Procedural conditions that restrict constitutional rights are noto-
riously difficult to explain in terms of current unconstitutional-
conditions doctrine. Especially in criminal cases, such conditions
seem to require an abandonment of the doctrine.112 Under the
analysis here, however, they are not so difficult to understand.
These conditions often clearly restrict constitutionally protected
rights, and the critical question therefore tends to be whether there
is constitutionally significant government force. Where procedural
conditions bind defendants into the future, they clearly are backed
by the force of law. For example, consider a deal between the gov-
ernment and a defendant that limits his testimony not only in the
112 See, e.g., Epstein, Unconstitutional, supra note 2, at 10-11 ("It roams about con-
stitutional law like Banquo's ghost, invoked in some cases, but not in others.");
Merrill, Dolan, supra note 2, at 860. See also Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative
System of Criminal Justice, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2117, 2118 (1998) (explaining plea
bargaining by analogizing it to administrative proceedings).
According to Merrill, "When we examine the full run of decided cases, we discover
a fairly robust version of the doctrine in connection with First Amendment rights and
certain separation of powers controversies; a much weaker version prevails with re-
spect to... criminal procedural rights." Merrill, Dolan, supra note 2, at 860. Indeed,
the waiver and forfeiture of procedural rights by criminal defendants tends to be dis-
cussed without even reference to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
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current criminal proceeding but also in future criminal proceed-
ings. If such a restriction deprives the defendant of his due process
of law, and if the condition is legally binding and thus is backed by
the force of law, it is unconstitutional. In contrast, if such a condi-
tion applies only in current legal proceedings, the government is
not relying on the force of law to implement it, and the question
therefore turns on the mere force by which the government in-
duces consent. " '
In this conceptual framework, it should be no surprise that plea
bargains do not really commit defendants until they come into
court. On account of the fact that these arrangements are negoti-
ated prior to trial, they tend to be called "bargains" or "agree-
ments," but they become binding on the defendant only when he
comes before the court to recite a formal waiver. The condition
therefore is not so much a commitment into the future as an im-
mediate sacrifice of liberty.'
Even after a court accepts a defendant's waiver of rights-for
example, his guilty plea-it still can deny the other side of the bar-
gain, as when it imposes twenty years on a defendant who pled
guilty in exchange for a prosecutorial recommendation of ten
years. This confirms that the plea bargain or other arrangement is
not a condition that binds into the future. Rather than bargain and
submit to a commitment before he gets to court, the defendant
gives up his rights only when he gets to court. "5
.. The conditions discussed here thus are different from those in Legal Services
Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001), in which the Supreme Court overturned a
condition on the government's funding of the Legal Services Corporation. The gov-
ernment funded the corporation on the condition that it not engage in representation
involving an effort to amend or otherwise challenge the validity of existing welfare
law. This was unconstitutional because, among other things, it "threatens severe im-
pairment of the judicial function." Id. at 546. It was, moreover, a condition running
into the future, and it thus collaterally had the force of law.
114 This is even more emphatically true of waivers or forfeitures of rights on the
streets, before the defendant comes into court.
"' This tends to be acknowledged in the agreements themselves, which usually rec-
ognize that prosecutors cannot promise any particular result, but rather can at best
promise a particular recommendation to the judge. See Daniel C. Richman, Cooper-
ating Clients, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 69, 72-73, 92, 94 (1995) (examining different types of
agreements between prosecutors and defendants).
Court proceedings take place over time, and there consequently is a degree of fic-
tion in describing plea bargains and other procedural conditions as immediate sacri-
fices of liberty. Instead, one might more accurately say that they are sacrifices of lib-
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Of course, even when conditions do not bind into the future and
thus lack the force of law at the implementation stage, and even
when they are not regulatory, there always is the possibility that in
one case or another they will have been induced by undue pressure
or mere force. It therefore makes sense that courts accept waivers
of procedural rights only where the waivers appear to be intelligent
and voluntary-that is, without constitutionally significant force.116
By understanding procedural conditions in this way, the courts al-
ready, in effect, are applying the analysis suggested here."7
In other words, plea bargains and other procedural conditions
tend to be constitutional not because consent can cure an unconsti-
tutional act, but rather because most procedural conditions do not
carry into the future and are not regulatory. In these circum-
stances, there are no easily recognized indicia of constitutionally
significant force. Such force, however, still may become apparent
on closer examination, and a court therefore must make a factual
inquiry about it by questioning the defendant.
Overall, the implications for conditions on speech, property, and
procedure reveal a textured and consistent analysis. One could
trace the implications for other sorts of conditions."8 The condi-
tions examined thus far, however, should suffice to suggest how the
analysis sorts out the cases. Whatever the subject matter of the
condition, the government cannot rely on consent to evade its con-
stitutional limits-most concretely, the rights and structures that
confine the government's powers. At the same time, the govern-
ment remains free to impose restrictions that do not violate its lim-
its. One way or the other, the analysis of unconstitutional condi-
erty at the commencement of the legal proceedings to which they apply. Once, how-
ever, one takes into account the extended chronology of legal proceedings, it becomes
apparent that courts treat plea bargains and other procedural conditions as much like
immediate sacrifices of liberty as practicable.
" 
6 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (requiring guilty pleas to be intelli-
gent and voluntary).
17 The consistency evident from this analysis stands in contrast to the view, noted
supra note 112, that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions cannot be consistently
applied to criminal cases.
'Consider, for example, government searches. If consent is no cure for a govern-
ment violation of a constitutional right, then it cannot explain the constitutionality of
government searches of persons entering or traveling on trains, planes, and other
common carriers. Instead, the explanation is that reasonable searches of such persons
are lawful regardless of their consent.
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tions comes to rest not on consent, but on whether the restrictions
are unconstitutional, including whether they come with constitu-
tionally significant force.
CONCLUSION
The prevailing confusion about unconstitutional conditions
arises from confusion about the role of consent. Such confusion,
however, is unnecessary. Although the government, under its con-
stitutional powers, can use consent to obtain conditions, the con-
sent cannot save restrictions that go beyond the government's
power. Private or state consent cannot enlarge federal power.
Consent, Delegation, & Force. -The risk of confusion arises
generally as to consent and in more specific ways as to delegation
and force. In each strand of the problem, confusion can be avoided
simply by distinguishing between what consent can accomplish and
what it cannot.
Most broadly, consent is no cure. To be sure, consent can be a
mechanism of lawful government power, but when conditions go
beyond such power, can consent justify the unconstitutionality? Al-
though the government often has authority under its powers to
seek consent to conditions, the consent cannot relieve the govern-
ment of the boundaries of such powers. Nor can it relieve the gov-
ernment of the limits that cut back on such powers, whether the
limits arise from rights (such as the freedom of speech and the
press) or from structures (such as the separation of powers and the
principles of federalism). It often is assumed that at least individual
rights can be sacrificed by individual consent, but rights and other
limits on the enumerated powers are legal limits on the govern-
ment enacted by the people of the United States. Accordingly,
when the government violates such limits, the consent cannot avoid
the unconstitutionality.
Similarly, delegation is no cure. The federal government fre-
quently uses conditions to get states and private institutions to im-
pose restrictions that violate constitutional rights and structures.
Because this delegation is done by consent, it is widely assumed
that the federal government thereby escapes its constitutional du-
ties. Delegation, however, does not allow a principal to avoid its
duties; nor does it excuse an agent that violates its own duties. Evi-
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dently, therefore, neither the federal government nor any state or
private institution can rely on the delegation to escape its constitu-
tional or other legal limits.
Last but not least, although conditions are not, by themselves,
legally obligatory or enforceable, they often come with govern-
ment force. It may seem odd to suggest that conditions obtained by
consent are subject to force, but it has been seen that the consent
and the force are different questions. The government always seeks
consent for its conditions, but the consent often is induced by
means of pressures that amount to constitutionally significant
force. At the implementation stage, moreover, the conditions often
are backed by the force of law.
It thus should be apparent that unconstitutional conditions are
not as formidable a problem as is assumed. In fact, for the condi-
tions that violate the Constitution's limits on government powers-
that violate the Constitution's rights or its structural limits on the
powers-there is not really a distinct problem of unconstitutional
conditions. Instead, there merely is the familiar problem of uncon-
stitutional government action, including the question of force.
Ultimately, the defense of unconstitutional conditions leads to a
disturbing question about government power: is it valuable for the
government to have a power to go beyond its constitutional limits?
It would be audacious enough to conclude that the government oc-
casionally must go beyond its bounds during severe emergencies.
But the claim for unconstitutional conditions goes further. It sug-
gests that violations of the Constitution-especially violations of
the rights and structural limits on government powers-are so con-
tinuously and predictably valuable that the Supreme Court must
authorize the government regularly to evade these constraints.
This obviously is not credible. If the Constitution is not merely to
empower government, but also to limit it, consent cannot be un-
derstood to authorize government to do what the Constitution for-
bids.
More Generally Unlawful Conditions. -Although this Article
has focused on the conventional unconstitutional conditions prob-
lem-that is, on the federal government's violation of its constitu-
tional duties-the analysis here also has implications for some ad-
jacent problems, one of which concerns the conditions that,
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although not unconstitutional, are nonetheless unlawful in a more
mundane way. It has been argued here that private or state consent
cannot relieve the federal government of the constitutional limits
imposed by the people. Similarly, such consent cannot relieve the
government of other, non-constitutional legal limits, such as those
in statutes.
Statutory limits are limits of law. Therefore, even if individuals,
institutions, or states relinquish their rights under these laws, they
cannot thereby give the federal government any power that is
barred to it by such laws. For example, if a statute allows executive
officials to restrict recipients of grants only in accord with proce-
dures dictated by the statute or a regulation, then the consent of
the recipients cannot give the officials a power to impose restric-
tions in another manner. Regardless of the type of law, contract
does not trump law.
States & Private Institutions in Violation of Their Own Legal Du-
ties. -Alongside the question of conditions is the much simpler
problem that arises when states and private institutions directly
violate their own legal duties at the request of the federal govern-
ment. The classic unconstitutional-conditions problem looks from
the top down, to discern whether the federal government has vio-
lated its duties under federal law. Another problem can be ob-
served, however, when one looks from the bottom up, to see
whether states and private institutions that act as the government's
agents have directly violated their own duties-under either state
or federal law.
This vantage point is particularly fruitful when federal condi-
tions ask states to act unlawfully, for states are subject to a wide ar-
ray of legal limitations. These range from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment (including the incorporated Bill of Rights) to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and various state constitutions and statutes.
Obviously, when states violate their own legal duties, there are
none of the complications traditionally, even if mistakenly, associ-
ated with unconstitutional conditions. On the contrary, there is
merely the straightforward problem of state violations of law, for
which a federal request is no excuse.
Put another way, if federal conditions do not satisfy the Suprem-
acy Clause, they cannot trump state law. The result is a constitu-
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tional double bind. For example, if a federal condition requiring
state licensing of speech is a federal law for purposes of the Su-
premacy Clause, then the federal government is directly violating
the First Amendment; and if the condition is not a federal law for
purposes of the Supremacy Clause, then a state that complies is di-
rectly violating its own bill of rights, the Fourteenth Amendment,
and § 1983.
Along similar lines, this sort of problem extends beyond federal
conditions to include federal statutes and regulations that directly
require states to violate their duties under the Federal Constitu-
tion. For example, when the federal government, in the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, requires institutions, including state institutions, to
license the transfer or other publication of information, it is requir-
ing the states to license speech and the press in violation of the in-
corporated Bill of Rights. Undoubtedly, a federal statute trumps
state law, but it cannot relieve the states of their duties under the
Federal Constitution."9
Free Speech. -Another of the adjacent problems is the obsoles-
cence of most contemporary scholarship and teaching about free-
dom of speech. Contemporary scholarship and teaching focuses on
the dangers familiar from the early and mid-twentieth century-
notably, the retail dangers of prosecutions, injunctions, and libel
actions. By now, however, in the early twenty-first century, the
leading threats to freedom of speech have changed. These days, the
most serious dangers come from delegated unconstitutional condi-
tions and other wholesale threats, and free-speech doctrine needs
to catch up with this reality.
Whereas eighteenth-century law on freedom of speech and press
focused on licensing of the press, early twentieth century law rec-
ognized that there were new dangers that required a further elabo-
ration of what was unconstitutional. Yet just as the problems of the
early twentieth century-the threats of prosecutions, injunctions,
and libel actions-seemed to extend beyond the problems of the
eighteenth century, so too the problems of the early twenty-first
century reach beyond those of the prior century. Times have
"'The danger that cooperating institutions and states will end up directly violating
their own legal duties is elaborated in Appendix C.
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changed, and as a result of the shifting circumstances, it is the
"modern" doctrine that now looks obsolete.
Indeed, whereas a narrow attention to licensing as the only
measure of speech freedoms once seemed rather rigid, it is now a
narrow attachment to the doctrines on prosecutions, injunctions,
and libel actions that seems thin and brittle. The battleground over
freedom of speech and the press has shifted from the courts to the
administrative agencies and the institutions they control through
conditions."' It therefore is ironic that the doctrine of the twentieth
century is celebrated as flexible and up-to-date.' Perhaps it once
was. But that was then, and now the "modern" doctrine needs to
be supplemented with a recognition of current realities. Fortu-
nately, all that is required to address the danger from conditions is
to recognize that conditions beyond the government's authority are
unlawful, regardless of consent.
Government by Contract. -The most serious adjacent problem
is the growth of government by contract. This is most immediately
dangerous because it allows the government to evade all sorts of
particular constitutional limits, such as the First Amendment. The
perils, however, run deeper.
Government by contract departs from the ideal of rule by law.
This ideal runs from at least the time of Aristotle, through the
growth of the common law system, up to today. A key stage in this
development was the elaboration of ideals of constitutional law in
seventeenth-century England, for by this means the Crown was
limited from governing through irregular methods and was largely
confined to ruling through the regular lawmaking process. 2 As
John Locke famously explained at the end of the century, "The
Legislative, or Supream Authority... is bound to dispense Justice,
and decide the Rights of the Subject by promulgated standing
Laws."'23 On this assumption, the U.S. Constitution similarly
2o It should be kept in mind that the conditions include not only what are formally
considered conditions but also the informal conditions that come in the form of
"guidance" and other under-the-table pressures.
121 See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Les-
sons from the Twentieth Century, 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 273, 274 (2009).
"2 Hamburger, supra note 53, at 70-100.
" John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 358 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
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placed all legislative powers in Congress and established how it can
enact laws.2 As it happens, such powers are very broad, and the
federal government therefore has ample constitutional opportunity
to restrict freedom. Nonetheless, the government increasingly re-
stricts freedom not through the regular mechanisms for making
law, but by contract. Although this is worrisome enough because it
permits the evasion of constitutional rights, it more generally is
troubling because it departs from the ideal of rule by law.
This irregular mode of government is dangerous in many ways
that run deeper than constitutional law. As has been seen, it allows
government to place extra restrictions, even unconstitutional re-
strictions, on vulnerable parts of the population. In addition, it al-
lows government to legislate in a hidden manner, known to those
affected but not others. As a result of both the unequal and the
hidden character of such regulation, those who are oppressed have
difficulty identifying the breadth of the threat. They feel they stand
alone, and they have difficulty forming the legal and political alli-
ances that might allow them to resist the oppression.
Even more profoundly, government by contract is incompatible
with the equality and freedom of modernized society. The United
States is the exemplar of such a society, in which individuals come
from diverse backgrounds and are highly individuated. In tradi-
tional societies, such circumstances are not typical, and where they
exist, they stand in the way of cooperation, for different communi-
ties tend to seek unequal privileges for themselves rather than a
common freedom. In a modernized society such as the United
States, however, diversity and individuation are prevalent. None-
theless, individuals in the society can successfully deal with one an-
other across their communal and psychological divisions by relying
on the laws, under which they can have at least some hope for
unity in their shared freedom. Rule by law, especially equal law,
thus is essential for the unity and freedom of American society, for
it allows individuals to cohere around their liberty. In contrast, rule
by contract threatens to deprive the nation of the common legal
foundation on which all can rely and on which all can place their
hopes. Put another way, to rule by contract, and thus to divide and
'24 U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, 7.
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conquer, is to deprive Americans of the sociological benefits of
rule by law.
Perhaps most dangerously, the government's use of conditions
to control states and private institutions, and all persons associated
with them, increasingly blurs the distinction between society and
government. The underlying danger is that this blurring of lines
diminishes the extent to which Americans can make their own
choices. This becomes particularly important when the conditions
dictate what Americans can read, write, and publish. The peril is
that government increasingly can buy its way into the mental proc-
esses of the public. Unconstitutional conditions thus are dangerous
not merely on account of their unconstitutionality, but more
broadly as threats to the independence of the society-indeed, the
people-in exploring ideas and making decisions in a manner not
manipulated by government.
Ultimately, conditions are part of an ongoing shift in the organi-
zation of society-in particular, a shift in modes of dependence.
The populace of medieval Europe consisted largely of serfs, who
were tied to the land and thus dependent on it. The populace of
modern societies has escaped such dependence by substituting
money relationships, particularly employment. Although this reli-
ance on money and employment cuts through the old form of ser-
vitude, it also carries its own risks of dependence-not really
Marx's "wage slavery," but nonetheless an impoverishing reliance
on money and employment. In this context, government benefits
lead toward a further shift in social arrangements. They offer a sort
of liberation from the market, but not without another sort of de-
pendence-that which binds variegated states, institutions, and in-
dividuals to a single government, systematically undermining their
diversity and independence, and subjecting them to all the perils of
an increasingly dominant centralized power.
The solutions probably will have to be as complex as the prob-
lem and surely cannot consist merely of law. Nonetheless, the law
matters, and an essential first step will be to recognize that the
government cannot rely on conditions to escape its constitutional
limitations. Consent is no cure.
2012] 567
568 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 98:479
APPENDICES
Appendix A: The Symsbury Case
An early illustration of the argument in Part III, that consent
cannot enlarge government's constitutional power, can be found in
the Symsbury Case-a 1785 decision from Connecticut. The case
could be relied upon to show how the question was understood at
the time of the Founding, but it is more substantively valuable to
illuminate the conceptual point that consent cannot cure the inva-
sion of a constitutional right-that consent is in this sense irrele-
vant.
The case concerned property rights, and one might think this is
precisely the sort of right that an individual or corporation could
bargain away. Property is merely a private right, and a private in-
dividual or corporation can give up its particular property rights,
even if not its right to property in general. Accordingly, the ques-
tion would seem to center on consent: why shouldn't an individual
or corporation be able to relinquish its property to government?
But if rights are exceptions to government power and thus limits
on government, then the focus must be on an entirely different
question: whether consent is relevant to justify the government in
going beyond its constitutional authority.
The Connecticut decision arose from a boundary dispute be-
tween the towns of Symsbury and Windsor. The disputed land lay
within a 1670 grant from the General Assembly to the proprietors
of Symsbury. It also, however, was within a 1686 grant from the
Assembly to the proprietors of Hartford and Windsor. The As-
sembly had attempted in 1727 to resolve the boundary conflict be-
tween Symsbury and Windsor by commissioning a survey, which
left title to the disputed border area in the town of Windsor and
those who held from it.'25 The next year, the Assembly even
adopted this survey in an enactment-thus giving it the force of
law. 26 Windsor's legislative victory, however, was precarious, for it
'' Symsbury Case, 1 Kirby 444, 445-46 (Sup. Ct. 1785).
' The act of the Assembly consisted of its approval of a surveyor's report. An Act
for Enlarging the County of Fairfield (Oct. 1728), Public Records of the Colony of
Connecticut 214-15 (1873).
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had been the second grantee. Indeed, decades later, in 1781, Jona-
than Humphrey and the other proprietors of Symsbury initiated
litigation against the unfortunate Thomas Bidwell, who held land
in the disputed area under the Windsor grant-the effect of the
litigation being to challenge that grant and the 1728 statute sustain-
ing it. 27 The case thus concerned the power of the legislature
(whether acting judicially or legislatively) to take property from
the proprietors of one town and give it to the proprietors of an-
other.
Although the case occurred after Independence, it turned on the
English constitution, for this was the constitution that had been
applicable at the time of the taking. This constitution supposedly
had been enacted by the English in the ancient mists of time, and
some of its requirements therefore could seem elusive. It was well
established in English law, however, that neither the Crown nor
any local legislative body acting under it could constitutionally take
property from one person and give it to another."
The case is interesting not because of the mundane point about
an unconstitutional taking, but because it provoked debate about
the relevance of consent. In opposition to the defendant's reliance
on the survey and the 1728 statute, Symsbury pled that it had
"Never... Had any Distinct Meeting, Resting and Acquiescing in
the Affixing of Said Lines" by the surveyors, which was as much as
to say that Symsbury had not formally consented to the redrawing
of the boundary.'29 When the defendant answered in bar that "the
Proprietors of... Symsbury have Ever Acquiesced in the Line"-
meaning that there had been informal consent-Symsbury's law-
yers shifted their argument, now asserting that the question was
one of constitutional power, as to which the town's acquiescence or
consent was irrelevant.3 ° They explained that because of the As-
sembly's instructions to the surveyors, and because of the conse-
quent survey, Symsbury's "Original Grant By the General Assem-
127For the reported case, see Symbsury, 1 Kirby at 445. For its commencement in
1781, see the pleadings in the Connecticut Superior Court, as copied in the Supreme
Court file on defendant's appeal, Thomas Bidwell v. Jonathan Humphrey, &c. (Su-
preme Court of Errors Oct. 1785; decided May 27, 1786), file, cover page, page 2, in
Connecticut State Archives, Supreme Court of Errors, Files [hereinafter Bidwell].
'28 Hamburger, supra note 53, at 194.
29 Bidwell, supra note 127, at 27.
30 Id. at 43.
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bly" and "their Deed & pattent are Greatly Altered Infringed Re-
duced & Curtailed[,] Which was Not in the power of the General
Assembly Constitutionally to Do," and "thereupon the Pla[i]ntiffs
Say that they Ought not to be barred .... Without that [i.e., not-
withstanding that] ... the Proprietors of... Symsbury have Ever
Acquiesced in the Line ... as the Defendant in his plea in Barr has
Alledged. ' '3' On these pleadings, the judges of the Superior Court
(including, incidentally, Oliver Ellsworth) held that the Assembly's
Act "could not legally operate to curtail the land before granted to
the proprietors of the town of Symsbury... being prior to the
grant made to the towns of Hartford and Windsor.' 32
It is a revealing decision. Even when the legislature transferred
property rights, consent was irrelevant to the question of its consti-
tutional power. Evidently, already under the English constitution,
at least as understood in America, a legislature could not escape its
constitutional limits by getting consent from the corporation or in-
dividuals deprived of their property.133
131 Id.32 Symsbury, 1 Kirby at 447.
" In contrast, in his dissenting opinion in a companion case between the same par-
ties, Governor Huntington only conceded, "I think it ought to be admitted in the case
before us, that the proprietors of Symsbury could not have their grant taken from
them, or curtailed, even by the General Assembly, without their consent." Id. at 452.
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Appendix B: Reverse Liability
The point in Part IV about delegation, that a principal violates
her own legal duties when she delegates forbidden acts to agents,
stands in contrast to another rule, which works in reverse, holding
a principal vicariously liable for her agent's violation of his legal
duties. This reverse liability is so familiar from tort and criminal
law that it may be thought to suggest that the federal government
does not violate its own legal duties when it delegates unlawful acts
to others. In fact, however, the reverse liability is applicable only in
some situations, which do not include constitutional law, and it
therefore does not call the argument here into question. Indeed, it
confirms that when the federal government delegates unconstitu-
tional acts, it violates its own constitutional duties.
When does either the direct or reverse analysis prevail? The
choice between the two seems to rest on whether the relevant law
more centrally focuses on harmful acts or potentially harmful per-
sons. This distinction could be drawn too sharply, but it is sugges-
tive, especially when one contrasts constitutional law to tort and
criminal law.
Tort and criminal law focus on harmful acts rather than poten-
tially harmful persons. These areas of law therefore work from the
harmful act or injury: they begin with the person who most imme-
diately did the act, and then move back to the person who sought
it. In this reverse inquiry, looking back in time from the injury, the
person who did the harmful act is considered the primary actor,
leaving the instigator to be held responsible in a secondary or vi-
carious way-in criminal law as an accessory, or for solicitation; in
tort law as the principal under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
In contrast, constitutional law concerns not so much harmful acts
as a potentially harmful actor. When a constitution gives power to
government, it creates an entity that is dangerously powerful, and
therefore, unlike tort and criminal law, a constitution does not
generally limit harmful acts, but rather the entity that might do
harm. For example, the U.S. Constitution does not generally forbid
inequality, but only some government-imposed inequalities. Simi-
larly, the Constitution does not bar all licensing of speech or the
press. On the contrary, the Constitution leaves room for owners of
copyrighted material or proprietary information to license its use,
2012]
Virginia Law Review
and merely bars another sort of licensing, in which the government
requires licensing of what does not belong to it. Evidently, rather
than generally limit dangerous acts, the Constitution limits only the
danger arising from the government's power.
On account of this focus on the government's dangerous power,
it is not possible in constitutional law to work in reverse from a
dangerous act, as one would when determining liability in tort or
criminal law. Instead, one must begin with the government's viola-
tion of its own legal limits-most prominently, with its violation of
the Constitution. Then, one can move forward from the govern-
ment's violation of its own limits to the secondary violations by the
entities the government engages to assist it.
The inapplicability of the reverse analysis is especially clear
when the federal government delegates acts that are unconstitu-
tional for it to do, but not for the cooperating entities. For exam-
ple, when a private university, in response to a consensual ar-
rangement with the federal government, imposes licensing of
speech and the press, the university cannot be said to have violated
the First Amendment. In such a case, it is not possible to work in
reverse from a generally prohibited act to the entity that carried it
out, and then back to the federal government. Nor should this in-
applicability of the reverse analysis be a surprise. Although such
analysis makes sense in areas of law that prototypically forbid dan-
gerous acts, it is largely irrelevant for constitutional law and other
areas of law that prototypically limit potentially dangerous per-
sons, such as governments.
135
,3 Of course, if proprietary information were understood too broadly, it could be-
come the basis for prohibited government licensing, but that is another question.
Along similar lines, the regulation of human-subjects research deliberately uses an
expansive notion of "private" information to create a prohibited licensing system. See
supra note 29.
"' The situation of the federal government under constitutional law can be com-
pared to a corporate insider or government official, Fred, who cannot lawfully trade
in the stock of a particular corporation. If he hires Stacey to purchase the stock for
him, does this delegation enable him to avoid violating the law? Stacey may be nei-
ther a corporate insider nor a restricted government official, and she thus may be un-
der no special legal limitations in purchasing the stock. Moreover, she may have no
reason to know of Fred's insider or otherwise confined status. Fred, however, is con-
tracting to have Stacey do what Fred is barred from doing, and his delegation of the
prohibited conduct does not save him.
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Thus, notwithstanding the prominence of the reverse analysis in
tort and criminal law, it is beside the point in constitutional law.
This sort of law limits the dangerous power of government rather
than dangerous acts, and therefore when the federal government
delegates its dirty work to other persons, the question for the fed-
eral government is not whether it has unconstitutionally violated
their duties, but whether it has violated its own duties. And this
brings the inquiry back to the larger point about qui facit, that the
federal government cannot evade its constitutional limits by getting
someone else to act on its behalf.
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Appendix C: Delegation No Cure for Violations of Law by States
and Private Institutions
Adjacent to the argument in Part IV, about the effect of delega-
tion on the federal government, is another question about the ef-
fect of delegation on states and private institutions. As is evident
from Part IV, delegation cannot cure the federal government's vio-
lation of its own constitutional duties, but can it excuse states and
private institutions when it leads them to violate their own legal
limits?
This is not an unconstitutional-conditions problem, because al-
though the federal government delegates the unconstitutional re-
strictions by condition, the states and private institutions impose
the restrictions directly. Indeed, this is the reverse of an unconstitu-
tional-conditions problem, for rather than concerning whether a
principal avoids its duties by using conditions to act through
agents, this problem concerns whether these agents avoid their di-
rect violation of their own duties because they have been delegated
by their principal. The answer is obvious: just as federal violations
of law cannot be cured by state and private consent, so too state
and private violations cannot be cured by federal consent.
By Condition. -Even when the federal government uses condi-
tions to delegate unconstitutional restrictions, there is nothing
complicated about the violation of law by cooperating bodies. If
they violate their own legal duties, the federal condition or other
request cannot save them.
At the very least, this can be a problem for private institutions. If
they are barred by civil rights laws from conspiring to violate the
constitutional rights of individuals, does it help or hurt them that
they are complying with requests from the federal government to
implement its violations of the Constitution?'36 More typically, the
136 For a potentially relevant federal civil rights statute, see Conspiracy Against
Rights, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2006), which makes it unlawful for two or more persons "to
conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory,
or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him
by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, or because of his having exer-
cised the same." Id. Note also Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law, 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 (2006), which makes it a crime for any person acting "under color of any law,
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problem concerns the states. Does a state government rise above
its state constitution, above the restrictions on the states in the U.S.
Constitution, or above state and federal civil-rights statutes, merely
because it acts in accord with a request from the federal govern-
ment? How can a consensual arrangement with the federal gov-
ernment relieve a state, let alone a private institution, of its obliga-
tion to adhere to state and federal law?
The consensual delegation of unconstitutional restrictions thus is
a double-edged sword. If restrictions in federal conditions have the
force of law, they clearly are subject to the Bill of Rights and the
rest of the Constitution. On behalf of the restrictions, however, it is
emphasized that they are merely consensual. The suggestion is
that, because the restrictions in federal conditions are consensual,
they lack the force of law and therefore are not barred by the Fed-
eral Constitution. Yet if a restriction in a federal condition lacks
the force of law, it cannot trump state constitutions or state or fed-
eral civil-rights laws, and regardless, it cannot trump the incorpo-
rated Bill of Rights. Accordingly, when the federal government
persuades state universities to license speech and publication, their
consensual arrangement with the federal government is no excuse.
These state institutions are directly in violation of the Federal Con-
stitution, their state constitutions, and various civil-rights laws, in-
cluding 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Consequently, even if it were true that
consent could cure unconstitutional conditions, the consensual
character of federal conditions undercuts the position of the coop-
erating state institutions.
Put another way, if conditions are merely consensual arrange-
ments for purposes of constitutional limits on the federal govern-
ment, they are also merely consensual arrangements for purposes
of the Supremacy Clause. The federal government cannot both
have its cake and eat it. Or, if you prefer savory dishes, what is
sauce for the federal goose is sauce for the state gander.
The results are inescapable. Already when the federal govern-
ment secures consent to conditions that require states or private in-
stitutions to violate their own legal duties, the conditions are void.
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom" to "willfully subject[] any person ... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States."
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Later, if the states or private institutions comply with such condi-
tions, they will have acted unlawfully.
By Force of Law. -The federal government obtains the coop-
eration of states, however, not only by condition but also often di-
rectly by force of federal statutes, and it therefore is important to
note that even the direct force of a federal statute cannot excuse a
state from its violation of the Federal Constitution. Like other in-
stances in which states and private institutions violate their own le-
gal duties, this is not a matter of unconstitutional conditions;
rather, it is another illustration of the adjacent problem of federally
induced violations of law by other bodies-the general point being
that the other bodies cannot be excused from their own legal limits,
except by a law of higher obligation.
For example, even if a federal statute were forthrightly to re-
quire state and private institutions to license speech and the press,
the state institutions would remain bound by the First Amendment
as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, state
institutions that complied with the federal statute would be violat-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment and would be liable for damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the words of the Supreme Court, "Con-
gress cannot, by authorization or ratification, give the slightest ef-
fect to a State law or constitution in conflict with the Constitution
of the United States.'
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Far from being merely hypothetical, this sort of problem is all
too real, as can be illustrated by the HIPAA Privacy Rule.' This
federal rule requires various medical institutions, including state
institutions, to impose licensing on the transfer of all sorts of in-
formation, ranging from medical records to research data. Of
course, patients have an interest in the privacy of their medical re-
cords, but surely the unconstitutional licensing of speech and the
press is not the only way to address this problem. It therefore is dif-
ficult to avoid the conclusion that, when state institutions comply
'
37 Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610, 623 (1872) (holding that homestead ex-
emption in Georgia constitution approved by Congress impaired the obligation of
contract).
'm For the "Privacy Rule," see 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164, promulgated under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936, 2021-31 (1996).
[Vol. 98:479576
Unconstitutional Conditions
with the federal rule, they directly violate their own constitutional
duties, most notably their duties under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Even the direct obliga-
tion of a federal statute or regulation cannot excuse a state from its
federal constitutional duties.
Thus, the most immediate weak point in the current regime of
unconstitutional conditions is not at the federal level, but at the
state and private level. The federal government's violation of its
legal duties is the complex problem that usually gets analyzed in
terms of "unconstitutional conditions." But quite apart from that
problem, there is the utterly simple and inescapable reality that the
cooperating states and private institutions have their own legal du-
ties.
Federal conditions cannot relieve states and private institutions
of their legal duties, and even the direct requirements of federal
statutes cannot relieve the states of their federal constitutional du-
ties. Accordingly, though it is clear that the federal government
remains bound by its legal duties notwithstanding any delegation,
it also is clear that states and private institutions remain bound by
their legal duties, unless the federal government binds them with a
federal act of higher obligation.
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